The United States and Israel have launched a war that the Gulf states invested heavily in diplomacy to prevent. Now, those same states find their civilian infrastructure under daily attack.
If there is a silver lining to the conflict, it is that by retaliating so broadly, Iran has put to rest concerns about it stoking existing divisions among the Gulf states. In recent months, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have landed on opposite sides of armed conflicts in Sudan and south Yemen. But today, the Gulf stands united: in anger at Iran for its brazen aggression, in frustration with the US for ignoring its repeated warnings, and in profound confusion about what comes next.
Iran’s targeting of infrastructure and US bases across the region reflects a deliberate, calculated strategy. Commentators on Iranian state television have pointedly noted that Kuwait was a burgeoning global hub before 1991 but never fully recovered that status after the Gulf War. The Islamic Republic appears to recognize that forcing the US to return to the negotiating table requires more than just disrupting global energy markets; it requires leveraging the lasting damage it can do to the Gulf’s hard-won reputation for safety and stability.
The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) six member states currently face a horizon of poor options. Pursuing diplomacy too eagerly could anger a US president intent on absolute victory. Furthermore, it would risk legitimising a regime that has attacked the GCC on an unprecedented scale. Increasingly, these countries feel a mounting frustration at having lost their ability to shape key outcomes in their own neighbourhood.
This frustration has fueled intense speculation that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or even Qatar could act offensively against Iran, essentially joining the war. Near-daily reports—often of Israeli origin and always quickly denied—have alleged that such operations are already underway.
The UAE is the natural focal point of such speculation. Having mounted a stellar defensive operation against an extraordinary volume of Iranian strikes, there is a clear case for the UAE to reassert deterrence by striking Iranian targets directly. However, Emirati leaders remain wary of assuming a belligerent role, given the immense economic progress they have at risk.
Saudi Arabia has absorbed fewer strikes and kept a tighter lid on information. Yet, the Saudis have historically viewed themselves as the leaders within the GCC and may eventually look for opportunities to assert that role. Ideally, any effort they undertake would lead toward a diplomatic resolution, but given the scale of the Kingdom’s military capabilities, it is easy to see why the Israelis seem so eager to see them involved.
It is also worth considering whether competitive dynamics among the GCC could reemerge as the war continues. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are constantly competing to position themselves as US President Donald Trump’s indispensable partner. If Trump signals a strong interest in Gulf participation in attacking Iran, one or more leaders could see a strategic opportunity to gain ground against their neighbour. Once one Gulf state strikes, it could create immense pressure on the others to follow suit.
For now, the immediate priority across the region is stopping the Iranian strikes, reopening vital transit routes, and restoring energy production. But these states are also acutely aware that if the Islamic Republic emerges from this conflict intact and unmoderated, it will be emboldened and far more likely to pursue a nuclear weapon. Given the severity of Iran’s aggression, the UAE and Saudi Arabia will only support a resolution that meaningfully mitigates the threat of future attacks. If diplomacy cannot deliver that outcome, they may, individually or collectively, consider more aggressive alternatives.
The most likely near-term posture for the Gulf states is strategic patience—ironically, an approach Iran itself has long favoured. The UAE and Saudi Arabia will track the war’s trajectory closely, looking for signs that the US and Israel have a cogent strategy with achievable objectives.
If a decisive outcome appears within reach, the UAE and possibly the Kingdom could opt to join the effort, contributing air power at a relatively low-risk moment when the coalition already appears poised to win. If, instead, the conflict begins to look like an extended quagmire, the Gulf will move toward diplomatic facilitation, working to generate offramps that the US could accept without appearing to concede.
Strategic patience may be the wisest approach for now, but the longer the war goes on, the more the Gulf’s credibility as a stable hub erodes. And yet, if the GCC countries are seen to push the US toward diplomacy — consistent with Iran’s own strategy of coercing the Gulf to pressure Washington — it sets a dangerous precedent. The next time Iran wants something from the US, it would only need to attack the GCC to get it.
Of course, the GCC could consider a partial decoupling from the US to take the targets off its back. They have flirted with hedging their US ties by seeking partnerships with China, which has vital interests in the Middle East and has hinted at a willingness to help resolve the conflict. However, China’s primary concern — maintaining its energy supply — can be addressed without major security investments or geopolitical confrontation with the US. Its current strategy is working; it is unlikely to shift unless the regional order fully collapses.
Neither a Gulf-state offensive nor a war-ending deal is likely in the immediate term. But in the absence of a clear US strategy, the Gulf will seek to shape events more actively. Eventually, these states will begin to assert their own vision of how the US-Israeli war on Iran must end.