Rajan Menon
In January, the Russian Army passed an unwanted milestone: It has been fighting in Ukraine longer than Stalin’s Red Army fought Hitler’s Wehrmacht.
When Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, few expected Ukraine to be able to hold on for long. Ukraine has done more than hold on. In the fifth year of the war, it has slowed Russian advances to a glacial pace and backed President Vladimir Putin into a corner — unable to win the war or to find a way out of it.
But Ukraine now faces a problem with no quick solution. Its air defences, in particular Patriot missile interceptors, are dwindling, and Putin is planning to make the most of it. After more than 50 months of this war, the next few could be decisive.
By many measures, the momentum has been with Ukraine in 2026. Russia has eked out small gains on the front line at a high price. It is estimated to be enduring a casualty rate of around 30,000 a month, and its use of foreign fighters and its offers of hefty sums to induce former soldiers to sign up for renewed service suggests that it is finding it increasingly difficult to replenish the numbers. Some months, Ukraine has clawed back territory.
With the front largely frozen, the fight has shifted to the air. There, too, Ukraine has been holding its own. Ukrainian drone strikes on Russia’s overland supply route to Crimea and oil refineries deep inside Russia have necessitated fuel rationing. And strikes on Russia’s Black Sea and Sea of Azov ports meant Russian grain exports in August were the lowest in 10 years.
Russians now are less insulated from the war, and public support is wavering. Even Russian military bloggers have been grumbling. This spring, Yuri Podolyaka, a prominent Ukrainian-born and vehemently pro-Russian blogger with more than two million followers on Telegram, praised the Ukrainian Army for its seriousness. “They learn very quickly, by the way,” he said on his channel, “much faster than we do.”
None of this, however, means Russia has lost the war yet. Putin appears to be adamant that he will pay whatever price — human or financial — necessary to win. For months, this might have been understood as a failure to accept the reality on the ground. But as Ukraine’s stock of missile interceptors runs out, he has reasons for optimism.
The war in Iran has reduced global stocks of Patriot interceptor missiles — the US inventory has been diminished by some 65%, and in July the US paused some weapons transfers to Ukraine. That same month, President Trump raised, then dashed, hopes that he would clear the way for Ukraine to produce the Patriot system under license. Some European governments have transferred some of their Patriots to Ukraine, but others are — so far — holding on to their supply.
Russia, knowing how depleted Ukraine’s defences are, has ramped up production and has already significantly escalated its airstrikes. In July, UN investigators said that civilian and child casualties in Ukraine were at the highest levels since the start of the war. Russia has also been using new weapons, targeting new sites and gearing up for “massive strikes” on Ukraine’s energy grid heading into winter.
Putin is also ratcheting up economic pressure on Ukraine, attacking its Black Sea ports, necessitating a turn to bypass routes to export grain. That pain has been compounded by Russian strikes on Ukraine’s transport network, energy infrastructure and steel plants.
War weariness isn’t hard to find in Ukraine, but it hasn’t led to a loss of faith in the army or a surge in public support for sacrificing land to secure peace. An August poll revealed that 60% of Ukrainians are opposed to territorial concessions in the Donbas region in exchange for peace. If Ukraine can make it through this winter, Putin will have exhausted yet another avenue of escalation, and, as Russians increasingly experience the economic strains of the war, he will be left with few, if any, good choices.
Putin has consistently underestimated Ukraine. He may be doing so again. Either way, the next few months may prove among the most consequential of this war.