SINCE Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that federalism is part of the Constitution’s Basic Structure. Parliament’s amending power is wide, but it cannot destroy the Constitution’s federal identity. Yet, if Parliament can, by ordinary law, dismember States or downgrade some — or theoretically all but two — into Union Territories, without their consent or any direct say of their people, “Union of States” and “federalism” risk becoming empty phrases. States would then resemble overgrown districts at the Union’s mercy, a position irreconcilable with federalism as a Basic Structure principle.
Across mature federations, State territorial integrity is strongly protected. In the United States, Congress may admit new States, but no new State may be formed within an existing State, nor may States or parts of States be joined, without the consent of the affected State Legislatures and Congress. Once admitted, a State cannot be abolished or downgraded. In Canada, boundary changes affecting provinces require constitutional amendment under Section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982, with resolutions of Parliament and each affected provincial legislature. Provinces cannot be abolished or downgraded. Australia’s Commonwealth Parliament may admit or establish new States, but alteration of a State’s limits requires approval by the State Parliament and by a majority of that State’s electors in a referendum. There is no power to extinguish a State or convert it into a territory.
Germany’s Article 29 of the Basic Law requires territorial reorganisation of Länder to be effected by federal law and, ordinarily, confirmed by binding referendums in the affected regions. Small boundary changes involving no more than 50,000 inhabitants may be made by agreement between the Länder or by federal law with Bundesrat consent. Article 79(3), the “Eternity Clause”, protects Germany’s federal character and Länder participation in legislation. Brazil requires the creation, incorporation, fusion or division of States to have a plebiscite of the population directly concerned, followed by a complementary law of the National Congress after hearing the State Legislative Assemblies concerned.
India’s three major Commissions on Union-State relations — the Rajamannar Committee (1969–71), appointed by the Government of Tamil Nadu, and the Sarkaria Commission (1983–88) and Punchhi Commission (2007–10), appointed by the Government of India — took markedly different positions on Articles 3 and 4.
The Rajamannar Committee argued that Parliament should not unilaterally redraw India’s map and recommended mandatory consent of the affected State legislature. Alternatively, it suggested a binding Judicial Tribunal or referendum. Its warning was prescient: “It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which a party, which has no belief in a federal setup and which is pledged to the setting up of a unitary Government for the whole country, captures power at the Centre. If this eventuality fructifies, there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the Centre from doing away with the linguistic division of the States or, for that matter, to single out any particular State for absorption in any neighbouring State or from converting it into a Centrally administered area. All this could be achieved by a simple Act of Parliament passed by an ordinary majority and the State will be helpless.” The Sarkaria Commission regarded Articles 3 and 4 as necessary instruments of flexibility in a large and diverse federation and rejected mandatory State consent. But its defence rested largely on assumed Union good faith.
The Punchhi Commission treated Article 3’s consultation process as part of India’s checks-and-balances mechanism and observed that it would be nearly impossible to ignore State views. Later developments have shown the optimism of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions to be largely misplaced.
The Justice Kurian Joseph Committee on Union-State Relations, constituted by the Government of Tamil Nadu in April 2025, and of which the author is a member, examined these issues comprehensively in Part I of its Report, submitted in February 2026. It has recommended that India must now modernise Articles 3 and 4 in a genuinely federal spirit.
At present, Article 3 permits decisions central to federalism to be made through ordinary Parliamentary legislation, after only a non-binding reference to the affected State Legislature. This safeguard is plainly inadequate. Recommendation 1 suggests territorial reorganisation under Article 3 should be treated as a State-specific constitutional amendment requiring the concurrence of only the Legislature of the affected State, by not less than two-thirds majority of its total membership, or of each House, where bicameral. References to Article 3 should be deleted from Article 4, so that only laws made under Article 2 remain exempt from Article 368, the general amending provision.
The parliamentary threshold should also be raised: instead of the present requirement of “a majority of the total membership of each House and a majority of not less than twothirds of the members present and voting”, such amendments should require “a twothirds majority of the total membership of each House of Parliament”.