Daniel Poneman
The confused rollout of the proposed nuclear power deal with Saudi Arabia has created an opportunity to advance several vital US interests, if Congress and the White House can quickly agree on a path forward.
Despite widespread criticism and few publicly released details, it is clear that the deal could help limit the spread of nuclear weapons, strengthen US-Saudi relations at a tense moment and increase the possibility of peace between the kingdom and Israel.
But the deal, which would commit the Saudis to working with US companies in developing nuclear energy, is in limbo. After his administration announced it had been signed on July 22, US President Donald Trump called the agreement into question, saying it was contingent on progress towards normalised relations between the kingdom and Israel. Critics said that it would increase the risk that Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East will pursue and obtain nuclear weapons.
Under US law, a Saudi program with American involvement would already be subject to stronger controls than are required by international treaty or by any US competitor, including Russia and China. Parts of the Trump deal would go still further, not only requiring US consent before any Saudi uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing can take place, but also barring the transfer of sensitive technology. Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency could verify compliance.
Insisting on even stricter controls would undermine international limits on the spread of nuclear technology by driving the Saudis and other countries seeking their own programs into the arms of competitors with looser standards. It would also undermine the cause of Middle East peace by pushing Saudi-Israeli rapprochement even further out of reach.
Trump should use the leverage provided by this moment of limbo. To do so, he must send the deal to Congress or risk missing an opportunity.
To understand why critics of the deal are wrong, and why Trump should proceed, it is important to understand how US safeguards for civilian nuclear power projects developed over the years.
After the 1973 oil crisis spurred global demand for nuclear power, fierce competition broke out among suppliers eager to displace American dominance in the global market for nuclear fuel and reactors. Rivals such as France and West Germany dangled access to uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing as sweeteners to persuade customers such as Pakistan and Brazil to buy their reactors.
India’s 1974 Smiling Buddha nuclear test, which used American heavy water diverted from the Atoms for Peace program, highlighted the risk that peaceful assistance could wind up aiding the development of an atomic bomb. It eventually led the US to persuade France and West Germany to drop their reckless offers. In turn, Congress clamped down on support for foreign nuclear power programs through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
It took over 30 years of arduous US diplomacy to persuade other suppliers to adopt many of the more stringent standards imposed by the act, such as requiring governments to place all nuclear facilities in their countries under international safeguards and adopting dual-use export controls to prevent uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
Fast forward to the mid-2000s, when the UAE decided to start a peaceful nuclear program to meet its need for clean power. The Emiratis voluntarily forswore pursuit of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing and codified that pledge into law. Not satisfied with this commitment, both Republican and Democratic administrations insisted the UAE embed that pledge in its nuclear agreement with the US, and began referring to this new “gold standard” for nuclear deals.
But the world already had a “gold standard” for nuclear deals: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as bolstered by the 1978 Nonproliferation Act. Requiring even tougher constraints unilaterally would be self-defeating. And there was nothing “standard” about the UAE agreement; of the roughly two dozen other US nuclear agreements, only Taiwan, a special case, is similarly restrictive.
If the US squanders the opportunity to partner with the Saudis now, rest assured that it will lower the bar against proliferation in the Middle East and beyond. The Saudis could still get their reactors without the “gold standard” that critics of the deal say they want and without any American role in the future of their program. That would be a profound loss for US national security.