The Governor’s role as ex-officio Chancellor of State universities is often defended as a safeguard against local political interference. The argument may sound sensible, but it is flawed. The Constitution does not assign this role to the Governor; State university laws created it. It is a colonial inheritance, meant not to secure university autonomy, but to keep higher education under close executive control. Today, it has become a major flashpoint in Union–State relations, distorting federalism and paralysing universities.
The Governor-Chancellor model dates to 1857, when the British established the universities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, and made the Presidency Governors their ex-officio Chancellors. The Chancellor wielded wide powers: appointing Vice-Chancellors, nominating members to university bodies, approving delegated legislation—statutes, ordinances, and regulations—under university laws, and presiding over convocations. This instrument of colonial control continued after Independence, and passed unchanged into later State university laws, with little reflection on its compatibility with a democratic, federal republic.
For the first two decades after Independence, the defect remained latent because Congress dominated the Union and most states. Governors were largely ceremonial, real power rested with Chief Ministers, and there was little pressure to alter the colonial model. The problem surfaced after 1967, when Opposition parties formed governments in several states. The Governor’s office became increasingly political, and university governance became another arena of Union–State friction. Bills seeking to divest Governors of Chancellorship often stalled, with Governors delaying assent or reserving them for Presidential consideration.
The Governor is appointed by the President—in practice, by the Union Council of Ministers—and holds office during the President’s pleasure. There are only two bare qualifications for a Governor: he should be a citizen of India and above the age of 35. This skeletal standard has enabled appointments driven more by political convenience than constitutional merit.
Even the Union’s First Administrative Reforms Commission (1966–70) criticised the politicisation of the Governor's office, particularly the practice of appointing defeated or superannuated politicians. The Sarkaria Commission (1983-88) on Union-State Relations found that more than 60 per cent of Governors had been active politicians, many immediately before appointment, with quality declining steeply after the Nehru era. Ashok Pankaj’s study of Governors between 1950 and 2015 found that 52.3 per cent were politicians and 25.6 per cent former civil servants. It also revealed the insecurity of tenure. Only 18 per cent of Governors completed a full five-year term, while more than half served less than two years—37 per cent for less than one year and 15 per cent for one to two years.
These facts belie any claim of political neutrality. A Governor appointed by the Union and vulnerable to abrupt removal can hardly act independently of Union political agendas, especially in Opposition-ruled states.
The complication arises from the Governor’s dual identity. As Governor under the Constitution, he is ordinarily bound by the “aid and advice” of the State Council of Ministers under Article 163(1). But as Chancellor under a State university law, he functions in a statutory capacity and often claims independent discretion unless the law expressly requires ministerial advice. The Supreme Court has recognised this distinction between constitutional and statutory functions. This has enabled Governor-Chancellors to bypass elected State governments in key university matters such as Vice-Chancellor appointments, nominations to university bodies, and approval of statutes. In many states, delegated legislation under university laws is not even required to be laid before the Legislature—a colonial-era accountability gap.
The contrast with the President’s role as Visitor of Central universities exposes the double standard. Visitor functions are also statutory, but decisions on Vice-Chancellor appointments, nominations to university bodies, and approval of statutes are processed through the Union Ministry of Education. Central university laws also require delegated legislation to be laid before Parliament. The President does not operate as a parallel authority outside the elected government. While insisting on democratic control over its own universities, the Union uses the Governor's office to deny states the same accountability.
The contrast with the President’s role as Visitor of Central universities exposes the double standard. Visitor functions are also statutory, but important decisions are processed through the Union Ministry of Education. While insisting on democratic control over its own universities, the Union uses the Governor's office to deny states the same accountability
The elected State government establishes, funds, and administers universities, but the Governor exercises significant powers without political or administrative responsibility for the consequences. State universities are forced to serve two masters. When they pull in different directions, as in Tamil Nadu, Vice-Chancellor appointments are delayed, recruitment is frozen, projects are stalled, convocations are postponed, and degrees may be delayed. Nor is there any assurance that Governors possess the academic familiarity, administrative experience, or non-partisan restraint universities require. Often guided by narrow and opaque advice, they may bring into universities the very politics they are expected to keep out. Such an office is ill-suited to head State universities.
State universities are forced to serve two masters. When they pull in different directions, as in Tamil Nadu, Vice-Chancellor appointments are delayed, recruitment is frozen, projects are stalled, convocations are postponed, and degrees may be delayed
Global best practice treats the Chancellor as an eminent public figure who provides ceremonial leadership, presides over convocations, serves as an institutional ambassador, and exercises no executive authority. Universities in the United Kingdom, from which India borrowed the office of Chancellor, exemplify this model. In Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, and Glasgow Universities, the university bodies and alumni elect a ceremonial Chancellor. In several universities in the United Kingdom (Birmingham, Leeds), Canada (McGill, British Columbia), and Australia (Melbourne, ANU), the Executive Council or Board of Governors appoints ceremonial Chancellors following transparent selection processes.
Several commissions on Union-State relations have recognised these defects. The Rajamannar Committee (1969-71) argued that even the Governor’s statutory functions should be exercised on the advice of the State Council of Ministers, though this view has not been judicially accepted. The Sarkaria Commission (1983-88) recognised that the Governor’s role as Chancellor is statutory, not constitutional, and advised consultation with the Chief Minister. The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2000-02) called for political neutrality of Governors and a supportive relationship with universities. The Punchhi Commission (2007-10) recommended that Governors be relieved of statutory roles such as Chancellor and that states appoint eminent, apolitical figures instead. The Justice Kurian Joseph Committee on Union–State Relations (2025 -), constituted by the Government of Tamil Nadu, and of which this author is a Member, has taken the same view. It has recommended divesting Governors of the Chancellorship of State universities and enabling states to appoint eminent, non-partisan Chancellors.
Indian states have attempted alternative models. Karnataka’s 2000 legislation required State government concurrence for Vice-Chancellor appointments. Gujarat’s 2023 law removed the Governor altogether from the Vice-Chancellor appointment process in State universities. Other reform efforts have faced hurdles. West Bengal (2022) and Punjab (2023) proposed replacing the Governor with the Chief Minister as Chancellor. While State Legislatures are competent to choose their own models, a powerful political office such as the Chief Minister is not suited to a ceremonial Chancellor role. Kerala’s 2022 Bill proposed a State-appointed Chancellor drawn from eminent academics or public figures.
Tamil Nadu’s 2022 amendments to ten University Acts were a half-measure. They transferred only Vice-Chancellor appointment powers to the State government, while retaining the Governor as Chancellor for other functions (presiding over convocations, approval of university statutes, nominations to university bodies and search committees). A better reform would have displaced the Governor from Chancellorship altogether and provide provided, as Kerala proposed, for an eminent academic or public figure to be appointed Chancellor by the State government.
However, once Governors reserved these Bills for Presidential consideration, Punjab’s Bills were returned, the West Bengal and Kerala Bills were denied assent, and Tamil Nadu’s amendments became caught up in fresh litigation.
While State Legislatures are competent to choose their own models, a powerful political office such as the Chief Minister is not suited to a ceremonial Chancellor role. Kerala’s Bill proposed a State-appointed Chancellor drawn from eminent academics or public figures
The soundest model is a State-appointed ceremonial Chancellor: an eminent academic, scientist, or distinguished public figure, not the Chief Minister or a superannuated politician. The Chancellor should lend dignity and stature to the university, not wield executive power. Real authority must vest with autonomous university bodies such as the Syndicate, Academic Council, and Senate, functioning transparently, safeguarding academic freedom, and remaining accountable to the State government and Legislature.
The present Union government repeatedly calls for shedding our colonial past, yet clings to the Governor-Chancellor—a colonial-era, now highly politicised institution, whose drawbacks far outweigh any residual utility—as a means of indirect control over State universities. Withholding gubernatorial or Presidential assent from reform Bills undermines federalism and damages higher education. The Union must support these reforms, align university governance with global best practices, end proxy political battles, and respect states’ right to govern the universities they fund.
(The writer is a retired IAS officer of the Tamil Nadu cadre, a former Vice-Chancellor of the Indian Maritime University, Chennai, and Member-1 of Tamil Nadu's High-Level Committee on Union-State Relations.)