Liberals and conservatives in India are both likely to be alarmed by the findings of a study by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), a supposedly independent organisation mandated by the US Congress, which ranks India fourth globally in terms of the risk of ‘intrastate mass killings’ occurring within its territory during the 2025-26 period. The three countries worse off are Myanmar, Chad and Sudan, all war-torn countries.

The study. undertaken as part of USHMM’s Early Warning Project, acknowledges that mass killings are not currently happening in India, but the risk of it is high. Taking into consideration only countries where mass violence is not ongoing but are predisposed to it, India ranks second, after Chad, according to the report.

The term ‘intrastate mass killings’ used by the report might suggest state-backed violence exclusively, but in fact includes much more. It is defined as the deliberate killing of 1,000 or more civilians within a year by armed forces (state or nonstate) within a country, specifically targeted because of their membership in a particular group or adherence to an ideology.

Presumably, such a wide definition would include killings of and by terrorists and Maoists and the ethnic violence seen in Manipur. So, considering that 317 Maoists and more than 100 terrorists were killed by state forces in 2025, and more than 75 state personnel by Maoists and terrorists, India can already be supposed to go a long way towards meeting that watermark of 1,000 intrastate killings.

The Early Warning Project study is not a ground report. It is a statistical examination of 30 parameters that, when modelled together, can assist in the prediction of violence. In other words, India is not there yet, but conditions exist. The study flags India as a "potential new flashpoint" because its statistical profile closely resembles countries that have historically seen sudden onsets of mass violence.

Statistics has its uses, although Indian analysts are likely to scoff at some of the variables included in the model used by this report. One is a large population size. The report reckons — though in a correlational, not causative sense — that countries with larger populations are statistically more likely to experience episodes of mass killing. It appears fair, and rather obvious, to assume mass violence is more likely to break out in India than in Greenland.

Similarly, India’s historical record of communal violence would skew the country to the top of the charts, as would regional insurgencies. Considering that several forms of violence — terrorism, state repression, communal violence and insurgencies — are everyday realities in India, it is perhaps not reasonable to be embarrassed about keeping the company of Myanmar, Chad and Sudan.

Although informed by a typical white liberal worldview, the report correctly raises some red flags. One is the tendency of Hindu nationalism to characterise minority populations as a threat, thereby increasing the risk of targeted violence. The shrinking of civic spaces and repression of civil society are warning signs as well. While one may quarrel with the methodology of the study, the conclusions are worth paying heed to. Its reliance on assessments by NGOs like V Dem and Freedom House does lead it to amplify already existing negative narratives, but the truth of endemic violence in India cannot be papered over.