The 62nd Munich Security Conference, otherwise known as “Davos with guns”, has arrived at a pivotal moment. The United States has never demanded more of Europe, and Europe has never expected less of the US.
The conference is a fork in the road for the trans-Atlantic relationship. One path points to a lasting recalibration of the NATO alliance, with a stronger Europe capable of defending itself while sustaining a healthy, if diminished, partnership with the US. The other leads to continued trans-Atlantic infighting over shared values, national interests and the division of responsibilities.
The latter path is no longer a minor irritant in an otherwise sound alliance. It threatens a messy separation between the US and its foremost allies, which would undermine European and American security. It is in the US’s interest that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, leading the administration’s contingent at the conference, pushes progress towards recalibration. Regardless of the tone set by Washington, Europe must unite behind meaningful reform.
The American side has not made this easy. A year ago in Munich, Vice President JD Vance declared the death of the trans-Atlantic relationship as it was known. The proximate cause, he argued, was not Russia, China or another external actor, but a “threat from within” Europe’s retreat from its most fundamental values. In his telling, European allies had neglected defence capabilities and abandoned shared principles through liberal immigration policies and restrictions on free expression.
The speech was widely viewed as an intervention on behalf of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany party just before a national election. The administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy later indicated that the remarks reflected broader policy thinking. It argued that Europe’s “civilisational erasure” could be countered partly by support for “patriotic European parties”.
Tensions escalated further after President Trump complained that Europe had been insufficiently grateful for the United States’ role in World War II, had spent too little on its defence and might be unwilling to defend the United States in the future.
Although rhetoric has since softened, the possibility of rupture remains. Rubio recently stated that NATO must be “reimagined” in terms of obligations. The question is whether he will use Munich to criticise European partners again or outline a workable vision for sustained trans-Atlantic security cooperation.
The US should continue collaborating with NATO even if it reduces its direct role in European security. Washington must remain central to efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war, secure Ukraine’s future, strengthen Europe’s eastern and northern flanks and expand arms sales and military-industrial partnerships.
Ukraine remains the most pressing issue. If Washington intends to shift more responsibility for European security onto Europe, it must articulate a clear position on Europe’s role in sustaining any eventual peace settlement.
Europe also faces difficult decisions. The idea of a stronger, more integrated Europe, championed by President Emmanuel Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and other leaders, remains largely theoretical and constrained by bureaucratic inertia. Former Italian prime ministers Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta have outlined the necessary goals: a unified capital market, a continent-wide innovation ecosystem, a defence industrial base that crosses national borders and governance that prioritises productivity and investment over excessive regulation.
Momentum exists behind this vision. However, “strategic autonomy” requires significant political trade-offs, including defence mobilisation, higher deficits, reduced sovereignty and uneven benefits among member states. Many governments remain reluctant to make these concessions.
Commitments by NATO allies to increase defence spending, while welcome, are insufficient. European countries must abandon fragmented national defence projects and build a scalable continental defence industrial base. They must invest more in recruiting and training armed forces, not merely purchasing weapons.
Success would also introduce new complexities. Germany’s military spending already exceeds that of any other European nation and ranks among the highest globally. Britain, France and other countries would need to adjust to a Europe shaped by a powerful German military — a development that the founders of the Munich Security Conference could scarcely have imagined.
Constructing European strategic autonomy and a durable new partnership with the US will take far longer than a few days of discussions in Munich’s Hotel Bayerischer Hof. The worst outcome would be prolonged rhetoric without concrete progress. A conference established in 1963 to coordinate allied containment of the Soviet Union now risks evolving into a forum not for strengthening shared security but for managing a trans-Atlantic separation.
The New York Times