Volatile homecoming: Refugees return to uncertain Syria

Close to 1.5 million Syrian refugees have voluntarily returned to their home country over the past year.

That extraordinary figure represents nearly one-quarter of all Syrians who fled fighting during the 13-year civil war. It is also a strikingly fast pace for a country where insecurity persists across broad regions.

The scale and speed of these returns since the overthrow of Bashar Assad’s regime on Dec. 8, 2024, raise important questions: Why are so many Syrians going back, and will these returns last? Moreover, what conditions are they returning to?

While a combination of push-and-pull factors has driven the trend, the widespread destruction of property during the civil war poses an ongoing obstacle to resettlement.

Where are Syria’s refugees?

By the time a rebel coalition led by Sunni Islamist organisation Hayat Tahrir al-Sham overthrew the Assad government, Syria’s civil war had been going on for more than a decade. What began in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring protests quickly escalated into one of the most destructive conflicts of the 21st century.

Millions of Syrians were displaced internally, and about 6 million sought refuge abroad, primarily in neighboring states such as Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, with just over a million reaching Europe.

European countries are now struggling to determine how they should respond to the changed environment in Syria. Germany and Austria have put a hold on processing asylum applications from Syrians. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits returning refugees to unsafe environments, but individuals can choose to return on their own. The fall of Assad altered refugees’ perceptions of safety and possibility.

UN refugee agency surveys in January 2025 across Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt found that 80% of Syrian refugees hoped to return home – up sharply from 57% the previous year. But the factors motivating return are far more complex than the change in political authority.

Why are people returning?

In most post-conflict settings, voluntary return begins only after security improves, schools reopen and reconstruction is underway. Even then, people often return to their country but not their original communities, especially when local political control has shifted.

In present-day Syria, violence continues in several regions, governance is fragmented, and sectarian conflicts persist. Yet refugees are returning anyway.

A major factor is the deteriorating conditions in neighboring host countries. Many of those who returned in the early months after Assad’s fall came from states that have hosted large refugee populations for more than a decade and are struggling with economic crises, political tensions and declining aid.

In Turkey, Syrians have faced increasing deportations and structural barriers to integration, such as temporary status without the possibility of naturalization and strict local registration rules.

In Lebanon, recent violence and a sharp drop in international assistance have left Syrian refugees unable to secure food, education and health care.

And in Jordan, reductions in humanitarian support have made daily life more precarious.

In other words, many Syrians are returning not because their homeland has become safer, but because the places they sought refuge have become more difficult.

We do not have data on the religious or ethnic makeup of returnees. But patterns from other post-conflict settings suggest that returnees are usually from the majority community aligned with the new dominant political actors. After the war in Kosovo, ethnic Albanians returned quickly, while Serb and Roma minorities faced insecurity and threats of reprisals.

If Syria follows this trajectory, Sunni Muslims may return in higher numbers, as President Ahmed al-Sharaa led the Sunni rebel coalition that toppled Assad. Minority groups — including Alawites, Christians, Druze and Kurds — may avoid returning. Violent incidents targeting minority communities underscore ongoing instability. Recent attacks on the Alawite population have triggered new waves of displacement into Lebanon, while conflicts between Druze militias and the government in Sweida have led to more displacement inside Syria. These episodes illustrate that while pockets of the country may feel safe to some, instability persists.

Barriers to returns

One of the most significant obstacles facing refugees who wish to return is the condition of their homes and the status of their property rights. The civil war caused widespread destruction of housing, businesses and public buildings. Land administration systems, including registry offices and records, were damaged or destroyed.

This matters because return requires more than physical safety; people need somewhere to live and proof that the home they return to is legally theirs.

Analysis by the conflict-monitoring group ACLED of more than 140,000 reports of violent incidents between 2014 and 2025 shows that property-related destruction was concentrated in inland provinces, with cities such as Aleppo, Idlib and Homs sustaining some of the heaviest damage. With documentation lost, homes reoccupied and records destroyed, many Syrians risk returning to legal uncertainty or conflict over land and housing.

Post-civil war reconstruction will require rebuilding physical infrastructure and restoring land governance, including property verification, dispute resolution and compensation. Without this, returns will likely slow as people confront uncertainty about reclaiming their homes.

Shaping Syria

Whether the wave of returns continues will depend on security, reconstruction of housing and land systems, and the policies of host countries. Ultimately, Syrians are returning because of a mixture of hope and hardship: hope that the fall of the Assad government has opened a path home, and hardship driven by declining support and safety in neighboring states.

Whether these returns will be safe, voluntary, and sustainable will shape Syria’s recovery for years to come.

The Conversation