Siberian lifeline: Eurasia's great water gamble

For decades, the idea of redirecting a small share of Siberia’s vast freshwater resources toward Central Asia was dismissed as a relic of Soviet-era ambition. Recently, however, the proposal has gained renewed interest, as the underlying realities have changed: Central Asia’s water crisis is becoming existential, while Russia’s water surplus has grown to the point of posing environmental risks of its own.

The convergence of climate, economic, and geopolitical crises, together with new technological advances, has transformed this once impractical concept into an urgent policy priority. The Earth Sciences Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences has announced plans to assess the feasibility of redirecting 1-2% of the Ob River’s annual flow to Central Asia.

The figure is deliberately modest. Siberian rivers discharge roughly 3,000 cubic kilometres of freshwater into the Arctic Ocean annually, and the proposed diversion – about 20-70 cubic kilometres – would have virtually no impact on Russia’s vast water reserves. But for countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it could be transformative.

The scientific rationale is straightforward. Climate change has steadily increased Siberian river runoff by roughly six cubic kilometres per year, accelerating Arctic ice melt, coastal erosion, and permafrost thaw. Russia thus finds itself in a paradoxical situation: an overabundance of water in the north, while its southern regions – especially the Volga basin – grow increasingly dry.

Central Asia, meanwhile, is approaching an ecological tipping point. Glaciers in the Pamir and Tian Shan ranges, which supply up to 80% of the region’s river flow, are melting at unprecedented rates. By 2050, glacial meltwater could fall by 30-40%, disrupting agriculture, hydropower, and drinking water supplies.

Uzbekistan already loses an estimated 1.5% of GDP annually to water shortages, and Kazakhstan’s agriculture sector faces mounting losses from drought and soil degradation. More than ten million hectares of irrigated farmland in the region rely on rivers that have become increasingly unpredictable. Population growth will further strain the system, with electricity demand projected to rise sharply by 2030. Without structural solutions, economic and political instability is not a hypothetical risk but a statistical inevitability.

Russian scientists argue that the technical obstacles that doomed similar Soviet proposals no longer apply. Instead of massive open canals prone to evaporation, salinisation, and contamination, current plans envision closed-loop pressure pipelines made of high-diameter polyethylene or composite materials. Such systems could limit water loss to roughly 3% and mitigate environmental risks. Initially, seven pipelines, each about 2,100 kilometres long, could deliver up to 5.5 billion cubic meters of water per year. If expanded, the system could carry 15-20 billion cubic meters annually – still under 1.6% of the Ob’s total flow.

Global precedents show that mega-aqueducts, though costly, are feasible. Libya’s Great Man-Made River transports 6.5 million cubic meters per day under extreme desert conditions. California’s aqueducts move billions of litres across mountain ranges requiring continuous pumping, while Saudi Arabia supplies far-inland cities through long-distance pipelines. These systems had to overcome major engineering and energy challenges, which Russia and Central Asia will likewise have to confront.

The financial costs will be substantial. Early estimates place the project’s capital costs at around $100 billion, though geopolitical constraints, construction challenges, and material requirements could push the final price much higher. Annual operating costs are expected to total $700 million to $1.5 billion, driven primarily by electricity for dozens of pumping stations. Mobilising capital will require sovereign commitments, development-bank lending, climate-transition funding, and potentially a dedicated Eurasian financing mechanism.

Ensuring a stable power source would significantly enhance the project’s economic viability. One option is to build a nuclear power plant dedicated to meeting the system’s energy needs. But the biggest obstacle is not technological or financial; it is political. Eurasian history is littered with failed infrastructure initiatives. A project of this scale would require coordinated leadership, robust water-management arrangements, environmental guarantees, and long-term tariff frameworks. Russia would need to commit to a multi-decade hydrological partnership, while Central Asia would have to present a unified regional position – something rare in its modern history.

If implemented successfully, the Ob River project could usher in a new era of Eurasian integration rooted in shared water infrastructure and strategic interests. Without such intervention, Central Asia risks drifting toward a water crisis that could undermine its economic, social, and political stability for decades. The question now is not whether the project is technically feasible; it is whether leaders will act in time to prevent a catastrophe of their own making.

Otorbaev is former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan

Project Syndicate