Strategic Reckoning: Japan redefines Taiwan security

TAIPEI: A single word can crack the facade of a great power’s confidence.

That is what happened when Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan told lawmakers in Tokyo that a Chinese attack or blockade of Taiwan would constitute a threat to Japan’s “survival,” a legal threshold that would permit Japan to deploy its military overseas. She merely said aloud what has long been understood — that any crisis involving Taiwan would threaten Japan’s national security — but her comment was among the clearest public signals yet that Tokyo could help defend Taiwan from potential Chinese aggression.

Beijing reacted as if Takaichi had declared war. Chinese state media cast her as reviving militarist rhetoric from World War II, and a senior Chinese envoy posted what amounted to an online threat to behead her. China halted some Japanese imports, discouraged tourism to Japan, and stepped up coast guard patrols around disputed islands. Beijing routinely lashes out at Tokyo because of lingering resentment over Japan’s wartime past. This time, however, the fury is rooted in something more dangerous: China’s growing anxiety that its bedrock goal — isolating Taiwan and coercing it into unification on Chinese terms — is slipping away.

The Chinese Communist Party has long assumed that time and pressure would wear Taiwan down. If President Xi Jinping concludes that this bet has failed, he may escalate to sharper forms of coercion sooner than planned. For regional security, Tokyo and Washington must stand firm and signal unequivocally that increased Chinese pressure on Taiwan will trigger a coordinated response.

For years, China has applied a slow diplomatic and economic squeeze paired with nearly daily military drills and disinformation campaigns. These actions hover just below the red lines that might draw the US and its allies directly into a crisis. China’s goal is straightforward: to persuade Taiwan that resistance is futile and capitulation is the only way to avoid disaster.

Takaichi’s remark punctures that strategy. Because Japan hosts US bases that would be central to any response to Chinese aggression, her statement warns Beijing that dramatically increasing pressure on Taiwan is likely to draw a joint allied reaction. That is deeply unsettling for Beijing, which has spent decades trying to prevent Taiwan’s security from becoming a shared regional responsibility.

The timing of her comments compounds China’s worries. Taiwan’s next presidential election is scheduled for early 2028. If the Democratic Progressive Party — which resists Beijing’s unification ultimatums — wins again, it would extend a run that began in 2016 and, in Beijing’s eyes, further entrench a distinct Taiwanese identity and normalise defiance of China. Should that happen, Beijing may feel compelled to exert pressure still further.

That does not make an invasion inevitable. But it does raise the likelihood that China would restrict the extensive trade that remains economically vital for Taiwan, increase cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, and engage in more military feints around the island. All of this significantly heightens the risk of an accidental clash.

Beijing’s need to control the domestic narrative adds volatility. When the Communist Party faces a foreign challenge, it whips up nationalist outrage. The fact that Japan — a uniquely combustible source of Chinese resentment — is involved is especially fraught. By inflaming nationalism, Beijing boxes itself in: any future compromise with Tokyo risks appearing as a betrayal of the very public anger the party has stoked.

In a sign of Beijing’s alarm, Xi sought to drive a wedge between Washington and Tokyo by appealing directly to Trump to rein in Japan. Trump does not appear to have taken the bait. According to China’s readout of the call, he offered only a polite acknowledgement that Washington “understands” how important Taiwan is to China.

His muted response — combined with about $1 billion in additional approved US arms for Taiwan — seems to dash, at least for now, any hope Beijing had of convincing Trump to soften support for Taiwan in exchange for cooperation on trade. Xi now faces the combination he hoped to avoid: an American president unwilling to trade away Taiwan and a Japanese leader prepared to state plainly that a Taiwan crisis could ensnare her country.

Takaichi did not create this situation; years of relentless Chinese coercion did. Her remark merely made explicit what has long been implicit — that if Beijing keeps tightening the screws on Taiwan, it will inevitably draw in other democracies because the island’s fate now directly bears on their security. Airing out these shared stakes, as she has done, is a surer path to stability than pretending that silence will keep the peace.

The New York Times