Paranoid power: Xi's purges reveal his insecurity

During his 13 years in power, Xi Jinping has tightened his grip on every lever of authority in China – the Communist Party (CPC), the state, and the military – while extending surveillance into nearly all aspects of life. Yet his latest purge of nine top generals, like those before it, shows that he still sees enemies everywhere.

After taking power in 2012, Xi launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign within the CPC and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The crackdown was initially popular, given the depth of graft and abuse in China’s one-party system. But it soon became clear that enforcement was selective – a tool not for transparency or reform, but for consolidating power in Xi’s hands. In Xi’s China, advancement depends less on competence or integrity than on personal loyalty.

Even after a decade of promoting only loyalists, Xi continues to dismiss senior officials, including top military commanders. According to the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, nearly five million officials at all levels have been indicted for corruption under Xi. Countless others have simply vanished.

True to form, Xi’s regime claims that the military leaders targeted in the latest purge – including General He Weidong, a Politburo member, Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission, and the third-highest-ranking officer in China’s military – committed “disciplinary violations” and “duty-related crimes.” A more plausible explanation is that Xi is playing an endless game of Whac-a-Rival, desperate to preserve his grip on power.

Xi’s fears are not entirely unfounded. Each new purge deepens mistrust among China’s elite and risks turning former loyalists into foes. From Mao Zedong to Joseph Stalin, history shows that one-man rule breeds paranoia. Xi may already have lost the ability to distinguish allies from enemies. At 72, he remains so insecure that, unlike even Mao, he refuses to name a successor, fearing that a visible heir could hasten his own downfall.

This bodes poorly for China. By refusing to plan for a transition, Xi heightens the risk that the end of his rule – however it comes – will bring political instability. His emphasis on personal fealty over ideological or institutional loyalty is corroding a system once grounded in collective leadership. Governance under Xi is increasingly defined by sycophancy and anxiety rather than competence or consistency.

The military has suffered most from Xi’s insecurity. In recent years, the PLA has undergone sweeping structural reforms aimed at transforming it into a modern fighting force capable of “winning informationized wars.” But Xi’s purges undermine that goal by disrupting command continuity and eroding trust. His abrupt 2023 removal of the Rocket Force’s leaders – the branch responsible for China’s nuclear and missile arsenal – may even have compromised China’s strategic deterrent.

Replacing seasoned commanders with untested loyalists might strengthen Xi’s political position, but it weakens national security. When generals focus on political survival rather than military readiness, morale and cohesion suffer. Can the PLA realistically fight and win a war against a major adversary like the United States or India while constrained by Xi’s political paranoia?

So far, Xi has pursued his expansionist ambitions through coercion and grey-zone tactics rather than open warfare. But a paranoid leader surrounded by sycophants unwilling to challenge him risks grave miscalculation. Recall Stalin’s purge of the Red Army on the eve of the Nazi invasion – with disastrous results. In Xi’s case, the danger may not be an invasion of China, but one launched by it, should he order an amphibious assault on Taiwan.

For all the fanfare about China’s rise, the country faces mounting structural problems: a slowing economy, rising youth unemployment, and a rapidly aging population. Discontent may be simmering, but repression masks it. Any potential challenge to Xi’s authority is preempted through purges, prosecutions, and disappearances. Xi appears capable of ruling only through fear.

But fear cannot sustain stability. A leader obsessed with disloyalty can command obedience but not genuine loyalty. And obedience, far from a source of strength, often breeds fragility. It suppresses creativity, competence, and collaboration – qualities essential for effective governance. The great irony of Xi’s rule is that the more he consolidates power, the more vulnerable he becomes.

Mao’s purges ended in chaos and trauma. Xi’s methods are more sophisticated, but the logic – and perhaps the outcome – remains the same.

Brahma Chellaney, Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013)

Project Syndicate