Fragile Palestine: Recognition sans borders risks empty gesture

Nils Mallock

There has been a recent rush of countries to formally recognise the state of Palestine. Affirming Palestinian sovereignty marks a historic diplomatic milestone, yet the exact layout of its territory – a central requirement under international law – remains fiercely contested, from every hilltop in the West Bank to the ruins of Gaza.

To grasp what this moment means, we need to trace how borders have evolved – or dissolved – over Palestine’s tumultuous political history. The 1947 UN partition plan had envisioned two semi-contiguous territories for Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem as an international city.

That vision collapsed in the war that followed Israel’s establishment in 1948. Palestinians found themselves confined to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as fully separated territories, demarcated by the “green line” and placed under Jordanian and Egyptian control. These initial contours remain the internationally recognised basis for Palestinian statehood today – the “pre-1967 borders”.

In 1967, the six-day war saw Israel effectively triple its territory. It occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and annexed East Jerusalem. Settlements soon began fragmenting Palestine’s geography, particularly in the West Bank. These settlements are illegal under international law and often lacked even Israel’s official authorisation. Yet government pushback was limited, and state institutions frequently supported their growth.

The Oslo Accords of the 1990s carved Palestinian territory into Areas A, B, and C, each with different levels of Palestinian governance. Then, during the second intifada (2000–05), Israel built a separation barrier cutting deep into the 1967 borders. Six decades on, the West Bank resembles a fragmented archipelago rather than a cohesive state territory.

Expanding insecurity

In a recent study, my colleagues and I used satellite imagery to show the scale of this fragmentation. We tracked all 360 settlements and outposts that existed in 2014 over the following decade.

The average settlement expanded by two-thirds during that time. Collectively, they now occupy 151 sq km of built-up area, compared to 88 sq km ten years ago – a 72% increase. On top of this came hundreds of new settlements, with a wave of approvals after October 7, 2023.

Each settlement brings extensive military presence and infrastructure. Roads and checkpoints are designed to exclude Palestinians, severely restricting movement and economic activity. In some areas, violent attacks and harassment by extremist settlers are well documented. Under such conditions, building an independent state becomes nearly impossible.

The recently approved E1 project outside Jerusalem demonstrates the stakes. On paper, it is just another settlement. In practice, E1 will choke off the main road running north to south outside Jerusalem, effectively splitting the West Bank in half.

Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, hailed the project as “erasing” the idea of a Palestinian state, while the government presented it as a national security measure. In reality, the settlements have the opposite effect.

Our field research – four months of work surveying over 8,000 Palestinians – revealed an alarming dynamic. Living within a few kilometres of settlements nearly doubled the likelihood of engaging in high-risk violent action (by over 82%), while moderate protest dropped by 30–36%. Support for diplomatic initiatives collapsed, while backing for violent attacks surged.

Crucially, this wasn’t simply a reaction to settler violence. Settlement presence itself intensified collective moral outrage – a cognitive state that drives violent conflict. This mindset primes people to focus on threats and punishment rather than the risks of escalation. In the West Bank, that dynamic is particularly dangerous.

With over half a million settlers today – many armed, violence-prone, and radically opposed to leaving – these tensions will persist. And as settlements expand, so too will cycles of retaliation and political violence. The recent shooting in Jerusalem, where Palestinian gunmen killed six just weeks after E1’s approval, tragically demonstrates how quickly such cycles unfold.

Searching for leaders

Any viable Palestinian state must also include a plan for Gaza’s reconstruction and integration, once the horrific suffering and famine caused by Israel’s brutal attacks end. Yet Gaza’s largest political constituency today – 32% of the population – consists of those who feel represented by nobody.

Hamas is militarily decimated and has lost almost all remaining public support. Many countries, including the UK, continue to proscribe it as a terrorist group. Yet no alternative has emerged to represent Gazans’ interests.

In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority (PA) offers little better. Thirty years after its establishment in the Oslo process, it is widely viewed as illegitimate, corrupt, and ineffective. Polls consistently show deep public disillusionment.

The most realistic path forward is a restructured PA administering both territories, still dominated by Fatah but under reformed leadership. If elections were held today, the 89-year-old president, Mahmoud Abbas, would almost certainly lose. One figure with real support is Marwan Barghouti, currently imprisoned in Israel, complicating succession planning further.

Whoever leads a unified Palestine will inherit decades of failed self-governance, deep scepticism among the public, and Israel’s attempts to intervene in the process.

Making recognition count

Despite the immense challenges, building a functioning Palestinian state is not impossible. Recognition can become more than symbolic. Already, it is reshaping how major powers engage with Palestinian representatives while applying pressure on Israel’s leaders.

But as nations line up to recognise Palestine, they must confront what they are actually recognising. Recognition risks becoming an empty gesture unless it addresses the realities of settlement expansion and the violence it fuels.

Without creating genuine conditions for statehood that protect the interests of both Palestinians and Israelis, neither peace nor security will be achieved. The real choice today is no longer between one-state and two-state solutions. It is between recognising borders that have long since lost their meaning – or committing to build something viable.

Both the future of Palestinian statehood and Israeli security may depend on that choice.