Editorial: Self-reliance drives defence expansion

Indian security forces are going to get a wide range of advanced weapon systems and critical military equipment as the Defence Acquisition Council, headed by Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, has greenlighted proposals to the tune of Rs 79,000 crore. The fast-changing geopolitical dynamics, heightened threat perception from neighbours, and long-term security threats justify the splurge on boosting the warfare capabilities of the forces. Since 2014, India has been pursuing an assertive and proactive foreign policy, which is believed to be one of the reasons that necessitate increased spending on defence preparedness, unlike in the past when the emphasis was on restraint and escalation management accompanied by diplomatic offensives. Defence spending has more than doubled since 2014, and it is attributed to “strengthening its military foundations” and also long-term preparedness.

Secondly, making a virtue out of necessity, the government has been leveraging the increased defence spending to grow and nurture domestic industry and even tap export markets. The government’s pivot to indigenous production to reduce dependence on imports has been yielding results, as the percentage of indigenous manufacturing of defence equipment has nearly doubled since 2014, even though the government has not set up any new defence PSUs other than converting the existing Ordnance Factory Board into seven entities, which are 100% owned by the government but have a corporate framework to make them agile and nimble in both innovation and production. The opening up of the defence sector for private players, who now account for 23% of total production, is a bold step taken by the government. Besides becoming “self-reliant,” the government has ambitious plans to develop a defence industrial complex to boost defence exports.

Despite growing indigenisation, India is the second-largest importer of arms, and defence acquisition has been plagued by a number of problems. Some defence analysts are of the view that the scandals from Bofors to the Rafale jet controversy have exposed the systemic flaws in defence acquisition in general and government-to-government deals in particular. Besides flawed cost methodologies and estimates, two major issues are the lack of transparency and the lack of or ineffective checks and balances system. To give credit where it is due, the government did take steps to reform the defence acquisition policy, and its 2020 version, which was followed by the Defence Procurement Manual of 2025, did address some important issues and also incorporated new aspects such as the option of leasing instead of buying, increasing indigenous content requirements, and fixing issues that cause delays. Opinion is divided over claims, among other things, regarding “the highest degree of probity, public accountability, and transparency” in the procurement process. However, critics have maintained that frequent revisions brought with them new problems, which hopefully will be resolved over a period of time. Simplifying procedures and cutting red tape in defence acquisition is unfinished business.

While the government has made significant strides towards modernization and operational readiness, besides self-reliance through increased domestic production, which will yield economic benefits, it needs to make systematic efforts in bolstering jointness and integration in the institutional arrangement, build capacity in cyberspace and cybersecurity, R&D into and integration of AI/ML, and facilitate knowledge sharing and technology transfer between civil industries and the military sector. In an era of global uncertainty, geopolitical rivalry, and economic tensions, defence policy and national security strategy should work in tandem with foreign policy for optimum results.