Costly return | Ceasefire deal: It's back to square one

Farah N Jan

Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, the key negotiator between the US and Iran, announced on June 14, 2026, that the two sides had agreed on a deal to end the war. The accord will be officially signed on June 19 in Switzerland.

President Donald Trump announced it on Truth Social as a triumph, claiming that the Strait of Hormuz is open, the US blockade is lifted, and oil is flowing again. What Trump did not mention was Iran's nuclear program and its enriched uranium stockpile, the primary reasons cited for starting the war. The nuclear issue, along with ballistic missiles and Iran’s proxies, has been deferred for 60 days. This raises two critical questions: What was the war actually for? And what did the US achieve?

The answer is virtually nothing, and in the process, Washington lost credibility as a negotiating partner.

The "rationalist theory of war," developed by political scientist James Fearon in 1995, identifies three problems that drive states to war when they would prefer a deal: incomplete information about each other’s resolve; the inability to credibly commit to a deal; and the indivisibility problem, where the issue in dispute cannot be shared.

The war clarified the first reason. Each side saw what the other would actually do: how much force the US was willing to use and what Iran could absorb while remaining in the fight. What the war could not solve was the nuclear commitment problem, which has a long history.

Iran originally adhered to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), restricting its uranium enrichment to 3.67% and keeping its stockpile under 300 kg, verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This concentration was far too low for a weapons program. However, the US walked away in 2018, with Trump labeling it "the worst deal ever" over its sunset clauses and silence on ballistic missiles.

When Iran returned to negotiations in 2025, the US and Israel bombed the country while talks were ongoing. Similarly, in February 2026, when a deal was within reach, Washington and Tel Aviv struck Iran again, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and lead negotiator Ali Larijani.

The US has demonstrated a record of breaking the negotiating process. Consequently, Iran now insists on guarantees and immediate sanctions relief rather than vague promises of good faith. A state that previously kept its commitments and was still bombed has little reason to trust future pledges. The 60-day deferral is simply a window for Tehran to watch whether the US and Israel will hold the ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon.

The third problem of indivisibility is why the nuclear question remains the hardest. Most disputes can be split. Sanctions can be lifted by degrees, and even nuclear capacities can be capped and metered, as seen in 2015. What cannot be split is the US demand for zero uranium enrichment versus Tehran’s stance that enrichment is a sovereign right.

During the 2025 and 2026 negotiations, Washington's envoy, Steve Witkoff, demanded the total elimination of Iran's nuclear program and the dismantling of its three key sites: Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Iran refused, and both rounds ended in bombings.

The current deal does not cap Iran’s enrichment or dismantle its program. It merely ends the fighting, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, and consigns core disputes to a 60-day extension. In a recent interview, Trump stated he was in no rush to remove the near-bomb-grade fuel buried under bombed sites, claiming Iran would suspend enrichment for nonmilitary purposes. Under the Obama administration, 97% of Iran’s stockpile was shipped out. Because it fails to address these fundamentals, the Trump deal is a ceasefire agreement, not a nuclear accord.

The commitment problem remains unresolved, and the indivisibility issue is now worse. The 60-day deferral is not a resolution; it is the same unsolved problem with a clock attached.

Iran emerges with its enrichment knowledge intact, its stockpile buried, and fresh reason to believe that only a nuclear weapon can deter future attacks. Yet, Tehran also knows it stood its ground, struck US bases, and discovered that the Strait of Hormuz is a better deterrent than a bomb. The strait is open, oil is flowing, and thousands of lives were lost only to arrive back at square one.