Fragile calculus: Myanmar’s hollow vote and Its fallout

Myanmar’s military regime has announced elections will be held in three phases, starting on December 28 and concluding in January. Two outcomes are certain: first, the military-aligned party will be recorded as winning and, second, the government in exile – the National Unity Government – will fade even further into the background.

In the nearly five years since the military seized power in February 2021, the country has been engulfed in civil war, with the military pitted against People’s Defence Forces and numerous ethnic armed organisations. Thousands of resistance protesters, fighters and politicians, including President Win Myint and the ever-popular Aung San Suu Kyi, remain imprisoned.

The military controls the levers of government and all major population centres. But its brutal air, artillery and drone attacks have failed to crush the resistance. The resistance has captured large swathes of territory, restricting the elections to only 274 of the nation’s 330 townships. Inside and outside the country, the elections are seen as a sham. The military-stacked Election Commission has deregistered political parties for failing to meet criteria it set and has dissolved Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy.

The elections will occur under a state-controlled media landscape in which criticism is prohibited by the new Law on the Prevention of Disruption and Sabotage of Multi-Party Democratic General Elections. Citizens criticising the election on social media have been sentenced for up to seven years’ hard labour. For some offences, the death penalty applies.

The elections are an attempt to gain the legitimacy, at home and abroad, that currently eludes the regime. They are designed to demonstrate authority and an impression of effective control. By simulating compliance with international democratic norms, the regime hopes to promote a sense of normalcy, consolidate power and open the door to greater international engagement while preserving the status quo.

The National Unity Government and its supporters are calling on the international community not to send observers, but to denounce the sham. ASEAN leaders insist a cessation of violence and inclusive political dialogue must precede elections, and have rebuffed an invitation to send observers. The best the regime could hope for is that some individual ASEAN members join Russia and Belarus in sending observers. Thailand, previously ambivalent, now says it will be difficult for ASEAN to re-engage with Myanmar. China is believed to be supportive of elections, but has not committed publicly to sending observers.

Continued Western ostracism won’t matter to the junta, for whom regional legitimacy is more important than domestic or Western legitimacy. Neighbouring countries are concerned about peace and stability on their borders, irregular migration, unregulated mining that pollutes rivers, flourishing drug production and trafficking, and the proliferation of cyber scam centres enslaving and defrauding their citizens. Citizens of these countries demand their governments address these issues, and the elections will make contact with the regime more defensible. It won’t be a case, as before, of competing views on whether engagement or isolation best brings reform.

It would be a mistake to see these elections as a re-run of 2010. Those were held under the 2008 constitution, which ushered in a reformist government led by a former general. The upcoming elections will not be a transition to civilian or parliamentary rule, nor will they be an exit ramp for coup leader Min Aung Hlaing. To ensure his own safety, he will want to remain in a role where the apparatus of the state protects, not prosecutes, him.

The elections will be a sham, but they will usher in changes to the military line-up. The current commander will likely become president and choose a compliant officer as commander-in-chief. Parliament will be dominated by the military and its aligned parties. In the immediate aftermath, it will be hard to see any change in the fear and violence that sustain the regime.

However, under Myanmar’s tattered constitution, the military commander is not answerable to any civilian authority. Min Aung Hlaing’s replacement might eventually become his own man and favour a negotiated end to the conflict. The elections therefore open the possibility of some diffusion of power. Although unlikely, it may be better to have this remote possibility than no election and a continuation of the status quo: a brutal dictatorship and relentless war of attrition.

The National Unity Government in exile needs to engage with the reality that elections will be held, bringing the junta greater regional engagement, rather than wishing for some imagined day of meaningful international support. Otherwise, it could fade even further into the background.

The Conversation