

CHENNAI: The decision of the Tamil Nadu government, headed by Chief Minister C. Joseph Vijay, to discontinue the High-Level Committee on Union–State Relations chaired by Justice Kurian Joseph has generated considerable debate. The government has justified its decision on the ground that the committee's mandate overlaps with that of the reconstituted Tamil Nadu State Law Commission and that its unfinished work can be entrusted to the latter. In an opinion article titled “A Committee Ain't the Cause” (The New Indian Express, November 18, 2026), Praveen Chakravarty, Congress MP from Tamil Nadu, has defended this decision on constitutional, political and administrative grounds.
His central proposition is that a committee is merely an instrument, whereas federalism and State autonomy are the larger causes that must transcend political parties and governments. There is little disagreement with this proposition. However, the argument overlooks an important distinction: while a committee is indeed an instrument, the quality of the instrument, the expertise assembled, the research undertaken and the continuity of the institutional exercise matter enormously to the cause it is intended to advance.
The issue, therefore, is not whether an elected government possesses the executive authority to discontinue a committee constituted by its predecessor. It is whether discontinuing a specialised committee, after it has completed a substantial part of its work and is approaching the completion of its mandate, is administratively prudent, intellectually defensible and in the larger public interest.
Chakravarty is constitutionally correct in pointing out that the committee was constituted through an executive order and not through an Act of the Legislature or a constitutional provision. A subsequent government can review and withdraw such an order. No one disputes the executive authority of the present government to do so.
But the existence of a legal power does not automatically establish the wisdom of exercising it in a particular manner. The distinction between what a government is legally entitled to do and what it ought to do in the public interest is fundamental to responsible governance.
His comparisons with the revocation of appointments to the Child Rights Commission by the DMK government in 2022 and the discontinuation of the Loka Kerala Sabha by the new Kerala government are not entirely convincing. Revoking appointments to an existing commission is different from discontinuing an expert committee entrusted with a specific, time-bound research mandate. Nor is a consultative forum for expatriates necessarily comparable to a multidisciplinary committee examining the constitutional, fiscal, legislative and administrative foundations of Indian federalism.
More importantly, the Justice Kurian Joseph Committee had already submitted its first report, comprising ten chapters and extensive recommendations, and had proceeded with the remaining work. This was not an administrative arrangement that had remained dormant or an advisory body whose purpose had become irrelevant. It was an ongoing intellectual exercise with a substantial body of completed research.
A change of government certainly provides an opportunity to review the decisions of its predecessor. But such a review should be based on the merits of each decision, its public purpose and the progress already achieved. A blanket presumption that institutions established by a previous government should be discontinued or replaced cannot be a sound principle of governance.
One of Chakravarty's principal arguments concerns the political associations of the committee members. He refers to the political involvement of a member and his family and to the close association of another member with the former Chief Minister. He argues that such circumstances create a reasonable apprehension about the committee's political neutrality.
Political associations, where they exist, should neither be concealed nor dismissed. Equally, they should not be treated as conclusive evidence of intellectual bias. Professional competence, political association and the impartiality of a particular piece of research are separate questions.
The committee was chaired by Justice Kurian Joseph, a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India. Its members were K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty, IAS (Retd.), former Vice-Chancellor of the Indian Maritime University, and Dr. M. Naganathan, former Professor of Economics and former Vice-Chairman of the Tamil Nadu State Planning Commission. They were selected for their experience in constitutional law, public administration and economics.
Dr. M. Naganathan resigned from the committee on 4 May 2026, citing personal reasons in his resignation letter. Whatever political associations may have been attributed to him, his resignation preceded the government's decision to discontinue the committee. Following his resignation, the committee comprised only its Chairman, Justice Kurian Joseph, and one other member, K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty, IAS (Retd.). Consequently, the argument that the committee was politically biased on account of Naganathan's alleged political associations becomes considerably weaker and cannot, by itself, justify its discontinuation.
More importantly, the Government of Tamil Nadu did not discontinue the two-member committee immediately after Naganathan's resignation. It allowed the committee to continue for approximately six months. This is particularly noteworthy given the government's stated resolve to dissolve or reconstitute several bodies established by the previous government, including TNRERA and the SC/ST Commission, and its earlier indication of an intention to dissolve the State Planning Commission. If the government had considered the committee politically compromised or institutionally redundant, it could have discontinued it in May itself. Instead, the decision came only about six months later, when the two member committee was approaching the stage of completing its final report. This raises a legitimate question: what prompted the government to discontinue the committee at that particular point in time? Were there political developments or considerations that emerged recently which influenced the decision? In the absence of a convincing public explanation, the timing of the decision inevitably invites scrutiny.
More importantly, the most appropriate test of a committee's impartiality is the quality of its work. Are its arguments supported by constitutional provisions, judicial decisions, empirical evidence and comparative federal experience? Are its recommendations framed in the larger interests of the federal structure rather than the electoral interests of a particular party? These are questions that can be answered only by examining the report.
Language: Instead of treating the language question merely as a conflict between Hindi and regional languages, the committee examines it through constitutional equality, linguistic diversity, educational outcomes and democratic access. It questions the Census classification of 53 distinct languages under the Hindi umbrella and recommends a more inclusive approach to the Eighth Schedule, protection of vulnerable languages, and a shift towards high-proficiency bilingualism, with additional languages learned voluntarily. It also proposes constitutional safeguards to recognise linguistic plurality in Union–State communication and legislative proceedings. These recommendations concern the linguistic rights of citizens across India, not merely Tamil Nadu.
Delimitation: The committee approaches the post-2026 delimitation question as a structural challenge to federal balance. It argues that States which successfully implemented population stabilisation policies should not be disadvantaged through a disproportionate reduction in their parliamentary representation. Among its recommendations are extending the inter-State seat-allocation freeze based on the 1971 Census until 2126 or until demographic convergence is achieved, whichever occurs earlier; separating Union and State delimitation commissions; and providing equal representation of States in the Rajya Sabha. These proposals may be debated, but they address a fundamental question concerning the future balance of political power among States.
Elections: The report examines the constitutional implications of One Nation, One Election, the independence of electoral administration and the anti-defection framework. It argues that synchronising elections could undermine the distinct democratic mandates of State legislatures and recommends independent State Election Commissions for elections to State legislatures and local bodies. It also proposes reforms to the anti-defection law to strengthen legislative accountability and protect the voters' mandate. These are questions affecting the functioning of India's parliamentary democracy as a whole.
These examples demonstrate that the committee was undertaking a substantive constitutional and policy exercise with implications extending far beyond the political interests of the government that constituted it.
The government has stated that the unfinished work of the committee will be transferred to the Tamil Nadu State Law Commission because their mandates substantially overlap. The State Law Commission is also created by an executive order, and it does not possess any special enforceable power. This raises an important institutional question: does similarity in the broad subject matter necessarily establish equivalence in the nature and quality of the work?
A Law Commission primarily undertakes the examination of laws, legal reforms and related questions within its assigned mandate. The High-Level Committee, by contrast, was constituted as a specialised, multidisciplinary exercise on Union–State relations. Its mandate involved constitutional interpretation, fiscal federalism, public administration, legislative relations, education, health, language and electoral institutions.
These subjects certainly have legal dimensions. But they cannot be examined adequately through a purely legal or legislative perspective. They require contributions from constitutional experts, economists, public finance specialists, administrators, educationists, linguists and other domain specialists. The composition of the High-Level Committee and its research arrangements reflected this multidisciplinary requirement.
There is also a question of institutional continuity. The committee had already invested substantial time in research, consultations, data collection and the preparation of its first report. Its members and research team had developed an understanding of the issues and their interconnections. Transferring documents and records to another institution does not automatically transfer the accumulated intellectual capital, research networks, institutional memory and responsibility for completing the exercise.
If the State Law Commission is genuinely equipped to undertake the unfinished work, the government should explain how it proposes to replicate these essential features. Will it have a multidisciplinary team? Will it retain the research personnel and expert contributors? Will it follow the same terms of reference? Will the existing research and consultations be continued? Will there be a clearly defined timetable and a commitment to publish the remaining report?
Without satisfactory answers to these questions, the assertion that the Law Commission can replace the committee remains an administrative claim rather than a demonstrated institutional alternative.
Chakravarty is right in asserting that the cause of federalism does not belong to the DMK or any other political party. It belongs to all States and to the constitutional vision of India as a Union of States. Tamil Nadu's contribution to this discourse predates the present political contest.
The Rajamannar Committee, constituted in 1969, was a landmark initiative that placed State autonomy and the redistribution of constitutional powers at the centre of national debate. Its significance was not confined to the government that appointed it. Its recommendations became part of the wider discourse on Indian federalism and influenced subsequent discussions on Centre–State relations. The Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions at the national level further demonstrate that federalism is a continuing constitutional concern, not an electoral issue.
The Justice Kurian Joseph Committee was conceived in this tradition. Its recommendations on the constitutional amendment process, the powers of Governors, language, delimitation, elections, education and GST are intended to provoke a wider national debate. Their relevance does not depend on whether the DMK or any other party endorses them.
Indeed, if the report has political implications, that is all the more reason to subject it to wider scrutiny rather than allowing political disagreements to determine the fate of the research institution.
The fact that the first report was tabled before the Assembly election and subsequently became part of the DMK's campaign does not, by itself, establish that its findings were partisan. Political parties are entitled to draw upon public reports in advancing their arguments. That does not convert the underlying research into party literature. The appropriate response to any perceived bias is to challenge the evidence, reasoning and recommendations, not to presume that the entire exercise is compromised.
There is an important distinction between preserving a cause and preserving the institutional processes through which that cause is examined, articulated and advanced. Federalism may survive the discontinuation of a committee, but that does not mean the discontinuation is inconsequential. Institutions are not ends in themselves; they are instruments for generating knowledge, developing alternatives and informing public policy. Their value lies in the work they undertake and the public purpose they serve.
Chakravarty argues that the committee is not the cause and that its first report is already in the public domain. However, this overlooks a fundamental distinction between the work already completed and the work that remains unfinished. The publication of Part I does not render the committee's remaining mandate redundant. Nor can an existing report, however valuable, substitute for research, consultations and recommendations that are yet to be completed. Indeed, if the first report has established the intellectual and constitutional significance of the exercise, that should be a compelling reason to allow the committee to complete its work rather than discontinue it prematurely. The completion of the first report is an argument for continuity, not a justification for discontinuation.
The dissolution of this committee is perhaps the greatest disservice the TVK government has done to the cause of federalism in India. The committee's unfinished work covered some of the most consequential dimensions of Union–State relations, including fiscal federalism, and the administrative and legislative relations between the Union and the States. These were not peripheral subjects but central to the future of India's federal structure. By discontinuing the committee before it could submit its final report, the government has deprived the country of the benefit of a comprehensive, independent and multidisciplinary examination of these critical issues. The questions may continue to exist, and may even be debated individually, but the opportunity to examine them together through the institutional framework and research mandate of this committee has been lost.
The transfer of records to the State Law Commission may preserve documents, but the larger question is whether it will preserve the purpose, intellectual depth and continuity of the exercise.
The test of the present government's commitment to federalism is not whether it agrees with the political legacy of its predecessor. It is whether it is willing to preserve, examine and advance a body of work that could benefit all States. A committee may not be the cause, but abandoning an unfinished institutional exercise without demonstrating an equivalent alternative does little to advance that cause.
(The writer is former Professor of Economics, University of Madras, former Member (Full-Time), Tamil Nadu State Planning Commission)