Perceived wisdom has it that the longer a war goes on, the less enthusiastic the public becomes about continuing the conflict. After all, ordinary citizens tend to bear the economic and human costs.
Yet, as the war following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 enters its fifth year, the attitude of the Russian public remains difficult to gauge. Just over half of Russians, said a recent poll, expect the war to end in 2026. A majority say that if negotiations fail, Moscow should escalate with greater use of force.
As observers of Russian society, we believe this ambiguity in public opinion gives President Putin the cover to continue pushing hard for his goals in Ukraine. Yet a closer look at the apparent support for the war suggests it may be more fragile than the Russian leader would prefer.
From the first day of the conflict, Western strategy was largely predicated on the belief that economic sanctions would eventually cause either the Russian elite or society to persuade Putin to abandon the war.
That assumption rests on the idea that the legitimacy of Putinism depends on a social contract of sorts: Russians remain loyal to the Kremlin if they enjoy a stable standard of living and can pursue their private lives without interference from the state.
The Russian economy has struggled since 2014, so many analysts believed this social contract was already under strain even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. After four years of war, exclusion from European markets and a sharp rise in military spending have contributed to economic stagnation and mounting pressure on living standards.
One limitation of the social-contract approach is that it can downplay the role of ideology.
It is possible that Putin’s “Make Russia Great Again”-style messaging resonates with a significant part of the public. Polling has consistently placed Putin’s approval rating above 80% since the start of the Ukraine conflict.
Of course, the validity of polling in an authoritarian society at war cannot be taken at face value. Still, it cannot be ruled out that some support is genuine and rests not only on economic stability but also on backing for Putin’s pledge to restore Russia’s power and influence on the global stage.
Some scholars point to a “rally around the flag” effect. There was an apparent surge in Putin’s approval rating after the use of military force against Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022.
It is difficult to determine whether such surges reflect a real shift in public opinion or simply a reaction to media coverage and what people perceive to be the acceptable response.
The Kremlin has also tried to shield the public from the costs of the war. It has concealed the true death toll and avoided full-scale mobilisation of conscripts by recruiting highly paid volunteers. At the same time, the authorities have attempted to keep the economy stable by drawing down reserve funds.
This raises a key question: whether the “Putin consensus” might eventually weaken if the costs of the war begin to affect a broader share of the population.
Among observers, the common assessment is that a small minority of Russians oppose the war, a slightly larger minority strongly support it, and the majority passively goes along with what the state is doing.
Some independent pollsters still conduct surveys inside Russia. They report relatively high levels of support for the “special military operation” against Ukraine, often ranging between 60% and 70%.
However, researchers frequently point to the difficulty of obtaining an accurate snapshot of Russian public opinion. Polling questions may leave respondents worried about being accused of breaking laws that penalise “spreading fake news” or “discrediting the army”, offences that can carry lengthy prison sentences.
In Russia’s current political climate, refusing to answer or providing a socially acceptable response can be a rational choice.
Some scholars, including those linked to the Public Sociology Laboratory, continue fieldwork within Russia. Researchers sometimes live incognito in provincial towns, observing social practices connected to support for the war.
Their ethnographic research finds little evidence of a strong “rally around the flag” effect in provincial society. Other analysts have turned to digital ethnography of social media as another source of insight. But observers unfamiliar with the local and online context risk mistaking performative loyalty for genuine belief.
Many Russian citizens prefer to avoid political discussion altogether, retreating into what is often described as “internal emigration” — living their own lives while minimising interaction with authorities.
This pattern dates back to the period of the Soviet Union, but it resurfaced as political repression increased after Putin returned to the presidency in 2012.
There is little doubt that fervent supporters of the war exist in Russia. They tend to be highly visible and vocal, partly because the state allows them to be — for example, military bloggers reporting from the front lines.
Beyond polls and social media, everyday practices can also indicate the depth of genuine support. If enthusiasm for the war were widespread, recruitment offices would likely be overwhelmed. In reality, they are not.
Instead, Russia has relied heavily on financial incentives, extensive advertising, recruitment from prisons and coercive mobilisation. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of men have tried to avoid conscription by leaving the country, hiding from authorities or using legal exemptions.
As the Ukraine war enters its fifth year, the gap between the Kremlin’s narrative and the lived experience of ordinary Russians remains evident. The pattern echoes an earlier period: in the final decade of the Soviet Union, the leadership increasingly lost touch with public sentiment.
History does not necessarily repeat itself. But the parallels may still matter for those governing from the Kremlin.
The Conversation