In the Constituent Assembly, K Santhanam warned that mandatory State consent could entrench the “autocracy of the majority” in composite provinces such as Madras, where a Tamil-majority legislature might never permit Andhra’s separation. Sub-State minorities, he argued, needed the possibility of Central initiative to realise legitimate claims to Statehood when regional aspirations were blocked.
This concern explains why the framers did not give States an absolute veto over territorial reorganisation. A modern framework must therefore strike a careful balance. It must protect the territorial integrity of existing States by requiring legislative concurrence, supported by two-thirds of the total membership, before any new State is carved out under Article 3(a). But where the parent State withholds consent despite genuine, sustained and overwhelming sub-State aspirations, an exceptional referendum backstop should be available, providing a democratic pathway for regional minorities to seek separate Statehood.
Recommendation 2 states that for the formation of a new State under Article 3(a), the consent of the affected State Legislature, by not less than two-thirds majority of its total membership, shall ordinarily be mandatory. If such consent is not granted within the prescribed period, the President may order a referendum in the proposed territory. The proposal shall be deemed approved only if not less than three-fourths of registered electors participate and not less than two-thirds of the votes cast support Statehood. If both thresholds are met, Parliament may proceed without the legislative concurrence.
Proposals under Article 3(b) (increasing a State’s area), 3© (diminishing it), and 3(d) (altering boundaries) directly affect territorial integrity. Recommendation 3 suggests amending Article 3 to require the consent of the affected State Legislature by not less than two-thirds of total membership for area and boundary changes under Articles 3(b)–(d).
A State’s name is not an administrative label. It embodies linguistic, cultural and historical identity. Such a change under Article 3(e) should originate from the State, not be imposed by the Union. Recommendation 4 suggests amending Article 3 to provide that any alteration of a State’s name under Article 3(e) may be initiated only by a resolution of the concerned State Legislature, passed by not less than two-thirds of total membership. No proposal shall be made if the State’s name has been altered within the preceding 25 years.
The proviso to Article 3 requires reorganisation proposals to be referred to the State Legislature. The difficulty arises when a State is under President’s Rule under Article 356 and its Legislature is suspended or dissolved. In Manohar Lal v. Union of India (1970), the Delhi High Court upheld the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, although the State Legislature’s views were not obtained. In Re: Article 370 (2023), the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. Together, these decisions mean that during President’s Rule, the Union may reorganise a State without the consent — or even the existence — of its elected legislature.
But Article 356 is housed under “Emergency Provisions” for a reason. The Union’s role is custodial and restorative. A complete bar on territorial reorganisation during President’s Rule is therefore essential. Recommendation 5 proposes amending the proviso to Article 3 to provide that, notwithstanding anything in Article 356, no Bill for forming a new State or altering the area, boundaries or name of any State shall be introduced in Parliament while a Proclamation under Article 356 is in force.
Union Territories were originally conceived as narrow exceptions. Several later became full States, including Himachal Pradesh, Tripura, Manipur, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Goa. Union Territories suffer from an inherent democratic deficit. Both the First and Second Administrative Reforms Commissions acknowledged this democratic deficit. The 2019 downgrading of Jammu and Kashmir intensified this concern. Central administration must be temporary or exceptional, not a permanent arrangement for people desiring self-rule. Nor should new Union Territories be created by loosely invoking “security considerations”.
Small size is not a principled objection to Statehood – Goa, Sikkim and Tripura are comparable to several Union Territories. Recommendation 6 proposes introducing a new Article 3A providing that no new Union Territories shall be created and that existing Union Territories, except Delhi, shall be phased out. It suggests mandating decennial referendums in all Union Territories (other than Delhi), offering two options: (a) full Statehood; or (b) merger with a neighbouring State, subject to that State’s concurrence. A change shall be approved only if not less than three-fourths of registered electors participate and not less than two-thirds of votes cast support the chosen option. If neither option secures these thresholds, the territory shall remain a Union Territory until the next referendum.
India’s framework for territorial reorganisation still reflects the anxieties of the 1940s rather than the federal maturity of the 2020s. The Constitution continues to treat States as “destructible entities” existing at the pleasure of the Union. This is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s recognition of federalism as part of the Basic Structure.
Territorial reorganisation that affects the constitutional status, identity or dignity of a State is not a routine legislative matter; it belongs to the realm of constituent power. It should therefore be governed by constitutional amendment, not ordinary law-making. These reforms affirm that States are constitutional partners, not mere administrative units. A federal order worthy of India must preserve both national unity and the dignity of its constituent States.