

When a suspect is tortured to death in police custody, the fatal blows are struck by the police, but the murder is structurally enabled by a network of institutional gatekeepers.
In the Sathankulam custodial murder case of Jeyaraj and Bennicks, the brutal police violence was facilitated by the collapse of every statutory safeguard designed to prevent exactly this outcome.
The victims, whose bodies bore extensive injuries severe blunt force trauma, massive contusions, and peeled skin on their gluteal region were cleared as "medically fit for remand" by government doctors, remanded without physical examination by the Judicial Magistrate, and admitted without objection by sub-jail officials.
While trial court Judge G Muthukumaran rightly convicted the police officers of murder, his treatment of the complicit gatekeepers reveals a gap in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The doctors, the judicial magistrate, and the sub-jail officials were all deemed guilty of mere 'administrative lapses' warranting departmental action, leaving the architecture of impunity intact. Downgrading such lethal complicity is legally flawed. The actus reus and mens rea for criminal negligence can be firmly established against these authorities using the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Supreme Court precedents, and institutional recommendations.
Judge Muthukumaran noted that the doctors and jail officials were prosecution witnesses. Under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, which protects witnesses from being prosecuted on the basis of their own testimony, and the Supreme Court's precedent in Dinesh Kumar @ Deena vs State, their depositions cannot be used to frame them as accused. On this point, the judge is correct.
The flaw lies in treating this immunity as total exoneration. The judge should have made a judicial observation recording that independent evidence pointed to potential criminal negligence by the gatekeepers and recommended that the investigating agency examine whether a separate prosecution was warranted. Falsified 'Fit for Remand' certificates, Accident Register copies, jail admission logs, and CCTV footage showing the victims limping and bleeding were all capable of anchoring such a case.
The gatekeepers might argue they merely ‘failed to notice’ the injuries, framing their actions as passive oversights. This defence collapses under Indian penal law. Sections 32 and 33 of the IPC establish that ‘acts’ extend to ‘illegal omissions’. In PB Desai vs State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that criminal liability for an omission is triggered when a person abandons a clear legal duty despite having the capacity to act.
The Law Commission's 113th Report recommended inserting Section 114B in the Indian Evidence Act, creating a rebuttable presumption that injuries sustained during custody were caused by the custodial authority. The 152nd Report recommended strengthening mandatory medical examinations and empowering independent agencies to investigate custodial crimes. Both reports recognise that the medical officer and the judicial magistrate are not peripheral figures; they are the statutory circuit-breakers whose intervention is the last line of defence against custodial violence. Also, the DK Basu guidelines legally bound these officers to accurately document injuries upon arrest.
The trial court exonerated the gatekeepers primarily because there was no "shared common intention" with the cops involved. This rests on a misunderstanding of negligence. As the Supreme Court laid out in PB Desai, intent to cause harm is not a prerequisite for criminal negligence. Criminality lies in recklessness proceeding in the face of a known risk. The doctors and the judicial magistrate did not need a motive to kill. By observing men who were visibly traumatised, bleeding, and suffering from catastrophic injuries, and nevertheless clearing them for incarceration, they acted with gross recklessness, satisfying the mens rea.
The Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew vs State of Punjab established that a medical professional can be prosecuted if they did something "which in the given facts and circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do". No doctor acting with ordinary prudence would examine patients with shattered tissues and visible bleeding, prescribe blood pressure medication, and declare them fit for jail. This meets the Jacob Mathew threshold for gross criminal negligence.
It is crucial to acknowledge the systemic pressures that breed this institutional complicity. In deeply entrenched local bureaucracies, medical officers, jail officials, and even lower-court magistrates often operate under the overwhelming shadow of police power. As the Supreme Court observed in its landmark DK Basu vs State of West Bengal, law enforcement often operates with "ties of brotherhood", creating an environment where retaliation against whistleblowers or uncooperative witnesses is a genuine threat. Fear of administrative harassment, lack of witness protection, and the sheer daily necessity of working alongside the local police lead many professionals to simply ‘look the other way’.
However, while this systemic coercion explains why the ‘administrative lapse’ narrative survives, it cannot legally or morally absolve these gatekeepers. A doctor’s professional oath and a magistrate’s constitutional duty to safeguard human life cannot be subordinated to mere bureaucratic self-preservation.
The Sathankulam judgment rightfully punished the police officers who wielded the lathis, but it left the architecture of complicity entirely intact. Applying the principles of DK Basu, Jacob Mathew, and PB Desai, alongside the doctrines of professional omissions, it is evident that the institutional gatekeepers possessed both the actus reus and the mens rea required for criminal negligence.
Until the gatekeepers who rubber-stamp police brutality are prosecuted as criminal accomplices, custodial death will remain a protected, routine tragedy. This systemic impunity is only further cemented by the state's deliberate refusal to establish genuine oversight; for instance, the Tamil Nadu Police (Reforms) Act, 2013 violates the Supreme Court's directives by placing active-duty police executives like the DGP and district Superintendents on the very Police Complaints Authorities meant to investigate serious police misconduct. By mandating that the police investigate themselves, the state guarantees that the gatekeepers of justice remain the architects of its denial.
A Shankar Prakash, PhD is an Independent Criminologist