Elections conducted by a military junta tend to be viewed with considerable suspicion, and rightly so. In the case of Myanmar, it gets worse as the regime has dissolved a popular political party and has been facing the wrath of people in the form of a simmering civil war.
The low voter turnout and reports about coercion of voters indicate the lack of popular support and participation, and thus lend support to the view that the regime is trying to foist a puppet civilian government to acquire a veneer of “democratic functioning” which can be leveraged in international relations.
It is a ploy to win recognition from some foreign governments or at least give a fig leaf to nations already supporting it.
There are not many takers for the junta’s claim that these elections would bring political stability.
Besides the United Nations, many Western countries and human rights organisations have been skeptical about the exercise as they point to the atmosphere of fear, violence and political repression and the lack of an overall conducive situation for holding a free and fair election.
Instead of creating space for all political parties to contest in elections, the regime has dissolved the National League for Democracy, which was led by the jailed octogenarian Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung Su Kyi.
The absence of a dominant political force in the electoral fray deprives people of the choice to vote for a party they support. Moreover, vast areas of the country are not fully under the regime and where its writ does not seem to run.
Foreign policy analysts are of the view that countries such as China, which are lending support to the regime, could have nudged it to hold elections. For all practical purposes, China stands to gain from the continuing turmoil and the junta’s political manoeuvrings.
It has strong and deep strategic interests through economic corridor and deep-sea port projects, which will give access to the Indian Ocean. In the above scenario, India has to be pragmatic and maintain a working relationship with the junta to counter growing Chinese influence.
New Delhi cannot afford to put all its eggs in one basket and hence needs to have access to the anti-establishment resistance forces. All this comes at a cost – some perceived weakening in its general democratic stance. This was visible in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting in August with a senior junta functionary on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Tianjin.
Modi at that time had expressed the hope that the forthcoming elections would be held in a “fair and inclusive” manner involving “all stakeholders”. He had reiterated the official line that peaceful dialogue and consultation were the only way forward.
This was in alignment with India’s Neighbourhood First, Act East and Indo-Pacific policies. Similar to India’s initiatives in other neighbouring countries, New Delhi’s clout in the neighbourhood comes from development partnership and trade relations, besides defence and security management ties.
Though the outcome of the military-orchestrated election is a foregone conclusion, and however sham and farcical the whole process might have been, the international community should find ways and means to initiate a peace process to first end cycles of violence.
The civilians who are caught between the military and armed rebels will not be able to express themselves freely, and without that, no peace process or transition to an elected government would be possible.