Editorial: India’s stakes in Hasina’s return

The latter option would require India to formally extradite her as a criminal, which would require Dhaka to furnish credible proof of guilt.
Sheikh Hasina
Sheikh Hasina
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Sheikh Hasina’s announcement that she will return to Bangladesh in December has become a ticklish issue for New Delhi and Dhaka. The deposed former Prime Minister, who fled to India in the face of a student-led uprising in 2024 and was subsequently sentenced to death for alleged crimes against humanity, is demanding a new passport and a national identity card to enable her to return home as a rightful citizen. But the government in Dhaka has rejected her application. Instead, it wants her to return as a fugitive from justice. The latter option would require India to formally extradite her as a criminal, which would require Dhaka to furnish credible proof of guilt.

This makes for a tricky game of brinkmanship among the three parties involved: Hasina is essentially daring the new dispensation to carry out a sentence that does not meet the international standards of justice applicable to crimes against humanity; by insisting she re-enter by this door and not that other, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government headed by Tarique Rahman is in effect filibustering, appearing to play along with hardliners at home while trying to avoid having a hot potato in its hands. The third player in this drama, New Delhi, is playing the diplomatic game, needing to harbour the pro-India former PM while also keeping good relations with the new regime in the neighbouring country.

Although no date has been set for Hasina’s return, Bangladesh is witnessing widespread violence between supporters and opponents of the former PM. Her party, the Awami League, although banned since the August 2024 revolution, retains significant support in at least 28 districts. Its supporters have been attacking BNP offices and branches of Grameen Bank, which was founded by Mohammed Yunus, a bitter critic of Hasina and head of the interim regime that replaced her. The ruling BNP is caught between an Awami League galvanised by the prospect of Hasina returning and the resurgent Jamaat-e-Islami, which is baying for retributive justice to be handed to Hasina.

While this looks like a standoff designed to produce no tangible outcome, participating in it offers no particular advantages to India. Protracted unrest in Bangladesh in fact poses direct security, economic, and geopolitical risks for India along the 4,000-km eastern border. Any political turmoil in Bangladesh leads to a spurt in cross-border migration into our eastern and northeastern states. At a time when these Indian states, particularly Assam and West Bengal, are dealing with bitterly contested citizenship issues, an anti-India atmosphere in Bangladesh is only likely to vitiate matters. Furthermore, a destabilised or hostile Dhaka creates strategic opportunities for China, Pakistan and the United States to widen their footprint in India’s neighbourhood.

More urgently, the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty with Bangladesh, which governs dry-season water distribution from the Farakka Barrage, expires on December 12, just around the time when Hasina is planning to return. Requiring mutual consent, the pact can become a source of friction between India and Bangladesh at a time when nerves are frayed. Being the upstream party, India has control of flows through Farakka. The negotiations are likely to be exploited by anti-India parties in Bangladesh to stoke passions. Any concessions India might give to the neighbouring country are likely to be bitterly opposed by Bihar and Bengal. The situation calls for all the tact that New Delhi can summon.

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