The United States appears to be edging closer to military action against Iran, raising the risk of consequences far beyond the immediate battlefield. On January 28, President Trump sharply escalated his rhetoric, warning that if Tehran failed to meet a list of US demands, Washington could launch an attack “with speed and violence.” To underscore the threat, the Pentagon repositioned the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, along with destroyers, bombers and fighter jets, within striking distance of Iran.
At the core of Washington’s demands is a permanent end to Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. The administration has also called for curbs on Iran’s ballistic missile development and an end to its support for regional proxy groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. Trump appears to see a strategic opening in an Iran weakened by economic distress and the mass protests that swept the country.
But from the perspective of Middle Eastern security and nuclear proliferation, this moment is deeply troubling. Any US military action could unleash far-reaching and unintended consequences, including accelerating global nuclear proliferation — regardless of whether Iran’s current leadership survives.
Even if attacked, the collapse of the Islamic Republic is far from assured. Iran is not a fragile state prone to rapid disintegration. With a population of around 93 million, it possesses layered security structures designed to withstand crises. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps alone numbers in the hundreds of thousands when auxiliary forces are included.
After nearly five decades in power, the regime’s institutions are deeply embedded in Iranian society. Any leadership change would be messy rather than transformative. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio admitted, there is “no simple answer” to what would follow a collapse. Iran’s exiled opposition remains fragmented, disconnected from realities on the ground and ill-equipped to govern a large, divided country.
This uncertainty is precisely where the danger lies. Iran is a “threshold state” — one that has the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons but has stopped short of doing so. A destabilised threshold state poses three major risks: weakened central control over nuclear materials and scientists; incentives for factions to monetise or export expertise; and an acceleration logic, as actors race to secure deterrence before the state potentially collapses.
History offers sobering warnings. The Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s raised alarms about missing nuclear materials. The AQ Khan network later demonstrated how easily nuclear expertise could travel, spreading from Pakistan to North Korea, Libya and Iran. US action carries profound implications for global nonproliferation. Iran’s decision to remain at the threshold was an act of strategic restraint. Yet the joint Israeli-US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 — followed by Trump’s renewed threats — have sent a stark message: threshold status does not guarantee security.
This message reinforces lessons already absorbed elsewhere. Libya dismantled its nuclear programme in 2003, only to see NATO-backed airstrikes help bring down Muammar Gaddafi eight years later. Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in 1994 in exchange for security assurances, yet lost Crimea in 2014 and faced full-scale invasion in 2022. Iran now joins this list. It exercised restraint, and still faced military attack. As Iranian adviser Mehdi Mohammadi put it, US demands amount to “disarming yourself so we could strike you when we want.”
The logic is corrosive: if giving up nuclear ambitions leads to regime change, surrendering weapons invites invasion, and remaining at the threshold still triggers attacks, then only full nuclear possession appears to ensure survival. Should Iran’s leadership endure a US strike, it is highly likely to double down on a weapons programme.
Every state contemplating nuclear options is watching this confrontation. Saudi Arabia has openly stated it would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran does. Yet a US strike may unsettle rather than reassure Gulf allies, reinforcing perceptions that American protection is selective. Saudi Arabia’s growing defence ties with nuclear-armed Pakistan already reflect hedging against US unpredictability.
Turkey, too, has questioned why it should remain without nuclear weapons. An attack on Iran could accelerate Ankara’s own hedging. Rising instability would prompt renewed debates in South Korea and Japan about the reliability of US extended deterrence.
Rather than strengthening American influence, a strike on Iran risks fragmenting the regional order and teaching aspiring nuclear states a single, dangerous lesson: that ultimate security lies only in possessing the bomb.
The Conversation