Asymmetric edge: Iran’s resistance: A blueprint for Taiwan

As the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran grinds toward an uncertain conclusion, many observers have been quick to label the outcome a strategic win for China. The conflict has undeniably damaged American prestige globally and sparked anger amongst nations facing sharp inflation and disrupted supply chains. However, a closer look at Iran’s methods in resisting the United States reveals uncomfortable lessons for Beijing as it weighs whether to follow through on its threats to seize Taiwan.

Iran prevented the far more powerful United States from winning a war that, on paper, it should have easily secured. Tehran weathered decapitation strikes and maintained consistent counterattacks despite heavy bombing and inferior weaponry. Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz is particularly instructive. Its navy possessed only dilapidated surface ships, a few diesel-powered submarines, and numerous small, fast-attack speedboats. Furthermore, Iran’s air force lacked advanced attack aircraft and had no true bombers.

What Iran did possess, however, was a massive stockpile of drones and missiles — including anti-ship cruise missiles — capable of striking vessels in the strait and hitting military and commercial targets across the Middle East. Iran also decentralised its command and control network and dispersed and concealed its weapons in multiple locations to make it difficult for the United States and Israel to find and destroy all of them.

China’s military is certainly less lethal than that of the United States and has not engaged in major combat operations in nearly 50 years, but it holds clear advantages over Taiwan. Its navy boasts the most ships of any in the world, including advanced aircraft carriers, destroyers, guided-missile corvettes and nuclear-powered submarines. Its arsenal includes attack aircraft, bombers, drones and an array of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles.

Taiwan has significant capabilities too, such as anti-ship cruise missiles and drones, which can create what the US Indo-Pacific commander, Adm Samuel Paparo, calls a “hellscape” for China — a lethal 50-mile “kill zone” in the Taiwan Strait. It has fortified its sea and air defences, extended conscription, and otherwise responded to China’s massive military growth. More is planned. The Trump administration has assembled a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan that is likely to include drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, uncrewed underwater vehicles, air defence systems, high-mobility artillery rocket systems, mines and other systems.

These hoped-for weapons are critical because they could help Taiwan defend itself against China. They can help repel an invasion force by destroying units before they leave Chinese ports, sinking ships as they transit the Strait, and hitting forces as they attempt to land. The US LUCAS system, a reverse-engineered copy of Iran’s cheap Shahed drone, is an example of a “good enough” system that, when used in large quantities, can threaten amphibious forces and targets on the Chinese mainland.

Survival, however, requires more than hardware. Iran weathered massive strikes against its political and military leaders by quickly replacing them and decentralising military command and control. It maximised deception, stored weapons in underground bunkers to increase survivability, and relied on mobile systems that could be quickly rolled out, launched and rolled back into bunkers.

Taiwan needs to prepare similar moves to survive the potential disruption of its command networks and to be ready to fight in the face of decapitation strikes, space and counterspace attacks and offensive cyberoperations. Doing this will require plans for succession, decentralised command and control, deception and survivability.

The Iran war highlighted the lesson that air power alone cannot win wars. To avoid casualties or getting dragged into a protracted conflict, America relied on air power against Iran. While China is probably willing to take more casualties in a Taiwan conflict, the Iran war is a reminder that China would most likely still need to deploy ground troops and risk heavy losses to seize the island.

The Iran war may yet turn out to be a geopolitical windfall for Beijing, but it also serves as a warning — and an opportunity — for Washington and Taipei. Iran’s ability to frustrate a superior military underscores that determined defenders, armed with the right mix of asymmetric capabilities and resilient command structures, can deny even the most powerful adversaries a quick or decisive victory.

If the United States and its allies internalise these lessons — prioritising quantity over exquisite high-tech systems, investing in survivable and decentralised defences and encouraging dispersal, concealment and mobility — they can help Taiwan transform itself into a far more formidable obstacle to Chinese aggression. That may be enough to deter a Chinese attack from occurring in the first place.

The New York Times