Environmental governance offers another revealing comparison. One might expect bureaucrats operating under different political systems to respond differently to pollution crises. In practice, both tend to be guided by blame avoidance.

Policy failures carry asymmetric risks. Success may bring modest recognition, but failure can end careers. As a result, officials often focus less on learning from mistakes than on shifting responsibility elsewhere.

In China, this dynamic was evident in Hebei province’s anti-pollution campaign. In 2017, central authorities ordered drastic reductions in coal heating to curb air pollution near Beijing. Provincial officials, eager to demonstrate compliance and avoid blame, enforced the policy rigidly. The result was severe hardship for residents, including unheated schools during winter.

When public outrage followed, responsibility was deflected. Media narratives targeted Beijing’s middle class for valuing clean air over social welfare, rather than scrutinizing bureaucratic decision-making at either the local or national level.

A similar pattern unfolded in Flint, Michigan. Financially distressed and under state-appointed emergency management, the city switched its water source to cut costs. The decision led to widespread lead contamination and a public health crisis. As scrutiny intensified, responsibility was fragmented among local officials, state regulators, and federal agencies, each attempting to deflect blame.

Parallel dynamics also emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese authorities were often credited with an “authoritarian advantage” that allowed swift, decisive action. But bureaucratic careerism constrained evidence-based policymaking in both China and the US.

Officials in both systems were risk-averse and reluctant to contradict political superiors. Early responses were marked by uncertainty, fragmented information, and hesitation—despite very different institutional settings.

In China, these dynamics contributed to delays during the critical early phase of the outbreak, even though they were later obscured by an official narrative emphasizing efficiency and success. In the US, decentralization produced similar delays and inconsistencies. In both countries, bureaucratic caution had real public health consequences and eroded public trust.

At a time of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, it is easy to overlook the stabilizing role of bureaucracy. Political leaders set agendas, but bureaucrats translate rhetoric into action. And that translation is shaped more by institutional incentives than by ideology.

The core operating logic of Chinese and American bureaucracies has remained remarkably stable over time. This continuity is increasingly reflected in converging leadership styles, with both systems exhibiting centralized authority, campaign-style politics, and heightened personalization of power.

There is an upside to this convergence. Similar bureaucratic behavior makes both superpowers more predictable, even amid heated rhetoric. Grand announcements rarely translate immediately into action; they are filtered through routines, procedures, and risk calculations.

In volatile times, those routines act as an anchor of stability — reminding us that while politics divides, bureaucracy often unites in practice.

The Conversation

Environmental governance offers another revealing comparison. One might expect bureaucrats operating under different political systems to respond differently to pollution crises. In practice, both tend to be guided by blame avoidance.

Policy failures carry asymmetric risks. Success may bring modest recognition, but failure can end careers. As a result, officials often focus less on learning from mistakes than on shifting responsibility elsewhere.

In China, this dynamic was evident in Hebei province’s anti-pollution campaign. In 2017, central authorities ordered drastic reductions in coal heating to curb air pollution near Beijing. Provincial officials, eager to demonstrate compliance and avoid blame, enforced the policy rigidly. The result was severe hardship for residents, including unheated schools during winter.

When public outrage followed, responsibility was deflected. Media narratives targeted Beijing’s middle class for valuing clean air over social welfare, rather than scrutinizing bureaucratic decision-making at either the local or national level.

A similar pattern unfolded in Flint, Michigan. Financially distressed and under state-appointed emergency management, the city switched its water source to cut costs. The decision led to widespread lead contamination and a public health crisis. As scrutiny intensified, responsibility was fragmented among local officials, state regulators, and federal agencies, each attempting to deflect blame.

Parallel dynamics also emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese authorities were often credited with an “authoritarian advantage” that allowed swift, decisive action. But bureaucratic careerism constrained evidence-based policymaking in both China and the US.

Officials in both systems were risk-averse and reluctant to contradict political superiors. Early responses were marked by uncertainty, fragmented information, and hesitation—despite very different institutional settings.

In China, these dynamics contributed to delays during the critical early phase of the outbreak, even though they were later obscured by an official narrative emphasizing efficiency and success. In the US, decentralization produced similar delays and inconsistencies. In both countries, bureaucratic caution had real public health consequences and eroded public trust.

At a time of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, it is easy to overlook the stabilizing role of bureaucracy. Political leaders set agendas, but bureaucrats translate rhetoric into action. And that translation is shaped more by institutional incentives than by ideology.

The core operating logic of Chinese and American bureaucracies has remained remarkably stable over time. This continuity is increasingly reflected in converging leadership styles, with both systems exhibiting centralized authority, campaign-style politics, and heightened personalization of power.

There is an upside to this convergence. Similar bureaucratic behavior makes both superpowers more predictable, even amid heated rhetoric. Grand announcements rarely translate immediately into action; they are filtered through routines, procedures, and risk calculations.

In volatile times, those routines act as an anchor of stability — reminding us that while politics divides, bureaucracy often unites in practice.

The Conversation

Environmental governance offers another revealing comparison. One might expect bureaucrats operating under different political systems to respond differently to pollution crises. In practice, both tend to be guided by blame avoidance.

Policy failures carry asymmetric risks. Success may bring modest recognition, but failure can end careers. As a result, officials often focus less on learning from mistakes than on shifting responsibility elsewhere.

In China, this dynamic was evident in Hebei province’s anti-pollution campaign. In 2017, central authorities ordered drastic reductions in coal heating to curb air pollution near Beijing. Provincial officials, eager to demonstrate compliance and avoid blame, enforced the policy rigidly. The result was severe hardship for residents, including unheated schools during winter.

When public outrage followed, responsibility was deflected. Media narratives targeted Beijing’s middle class for valuing clean air over social welfare, rather than scrutinizing bureaucratic decision-making at either the local or national level.

A similar pattern unfolded in Flint, Michigan. Financially distressed and under state-appointed emergency management, the city switched its water source to cut costs. The decision led to widespread lead contamination and a public health crisis. As scrutiny intensified, responsibility was fragmented among local officials, state regulators, and federal agencies, each attempting to deflect blame.

Parallel dynamics also emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese authorities were often credited with an “authoritarian advantage” that allowed swift, decisive action. But bureaucratic careerism constrained evidence-based policymaking in both China and the US.

Officials in both systems were risk-averse and reluctant to contradict political superiors. Early responses were marked by uncertainty, fragmented information, and hesitation—despite very different institutional settings.

In China, these dynamics contributed to delays during the critical early phase of the outbreak, even though they were later obscured by an official narrative emphasizing efficiency and success. In the US, decentralization produced similar delays and inconsistencies. In both countries, bureaucratic caution had real public health consequences and eroded public trust.

At a time of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, it is easy to overlook the stabilizing role of bureaucracy. Political leaders set agendas, but bureaucrats translate rhetoric into action. And that translation is shaped more by institutional incentives than by ideology.

The core operating logic of Chinese and American bureaucracies has remained remarkably stable over time. This continuity is increasingly reflected in converging leadership styles, with both systems exhibiting centralized authority, campaign-style politics, and heightened personalization of power.

There is an upside to this convergence. Similar bureaucratic behavior makes both superpowers more predictable, even amid heated rhetoric. Grand announcements rarely translate immediately into action; they are filtered through routines, procedures, and risk calculations.

In volatile times, those routines act as an anchor of stability — reminding us that while politics divides, bureaucracy often unites in practice.

The Conversation