On what grounds has bail become prohibitively rigid under the UAPA, particularly in the context of Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam spending nearly six years incarcerated without trial? How have the Union government and the judiciary justified such prolonged pre-trial detention?
— Karthick Manesh
The Unlawful Activities Act, 1969, was originally another criminal statute and did not contain the kind of stringent provisions it has today. From the late eighties, particularly after Operation Blue Star, the Centre sought a nationwide anti-terror law, leading to the enactment of TADA.
Its extensive misuse especially against political leaders and in cases unconnected with terrorism, notably in Gujarat led to widespread opposition and eventual repeal.
Undeterred, the government introduced POTA in the early 2000s, mirroring TADA’s harsh provisions, making bail extremely difficult. Tamil leader Pazha Nedumaran spent 19 months in jail before securing bail. POTA too was grossly misused, particularly by the Jayalalithaa government, with courts later dismissing all such cases. Amid strong resistance, POTA was withdrawn.
Yet, the State’s insistence on retaining a draconian law persisted.
The government quietly strengthened UAPA, transforming it into a far more potent weapon. The real danger lies not merely in the law but in judicial indifference to protecting citizens from State oppression. The long-held principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception has now been reversed. What is urgently needed is a judiciary committed to the Constitution and its core values.
With Assembly elections approaching, there is a perception that courts are acting in tandem with certain political objectives. Udhayanidhi Stalin’s 2023 remarks on Sanatana Dharma had triggered controversy but later faded.
Now, as campaigns intensify, the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has revived the issue, observing a “clear attack on Hinduism.” Though no cases were filed in Tamil Nadu, some were filed elsewhere, and in 2025, the Supreme Court declined to entertain petitions seeking criminal action. What was the need for the High Court to resurrect a closed matter and label the remarks as hate speech? Does this not suggest judicial intervention benefiting electoral interests?
— Ramalingam, Madhavaram, Chennai
The core issue is that many, including sections of the judiciary, lack clarity on what Sanatana Dharma truly signifies. Individual interpretations vary widely, leading to inconsistent judicial approaches. In the present case, the petitioner was a North Indian accused of making a provocative speech, claiming he would eliminate those opposing Sanatana Dharma.
The judge quashed the criminal proceedings against him but proceeded to define Sanatana Dharma and criticise the Deputy Chief Minister for his remarks. Technically, a judge’s personal beliefs or faith cannot be imported into a judicial order. Such subjective interpretations risk undermining neutrality and blurring the boundary between constitutional reasoning and personal conviction.