Lawfully yours: By Retired Justice K Chandru | Can’t bring personal beliefs into judicial orders, Constitutional oath demands neutrality

Your legal questions answered by Justice K Chandru, former Judge of the Madras High Court Do you have a question? Email us at citizen.dtnext@dt.co.in
Retired Justice K Chandru
Retired Justice K Chandru
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Can’t bring personal beliefs into judicial orders, Constitutional oath demands neutrality

A High Court judge recently stated that Sanatana Dharma influenced his judicial approach. Given India’s constitutional commitment to secularism and equality before law, how should such remarks be viewed within judicial ethics? Do they raise concerns about the separation between personal faith and constitutional adjudication? Further, if one judge cites religious doctrine as moral guidance, could this open the door for judges of other faiths to invoke their own religious texts in judicial reasoning? What institutional safeguards exist to ensure that verdicts remain anchored strictly in statutory law and constitutional principles rather than personal belief systems?

— R Maragatham, Mandaiveli, Chennai

When Justice Victoria Gowri’s appointment as a Madras High Court judge was challenged, citing her earlier political remarks, then Chief Justice DY Chandrachud said personal beliefs or political views are not considered in appointments. However, once appointed, judges must take an oath under the Third Schedule of the Constitution to uphold the Constitution without fear or favour, and without ill will or affection.

The Supreme Court has held that judges cannot import personal beliefs into judicial orders. While judges may hold individual faith, their rulings must rest on constitutional and statutory principles. Institutional safeguards include the oath of office, binding precedents, in-house judicial procedures, and the appellate system, which can correct or set aside questionable rulings. India, however, does not yet have a comprehensive judicial accountability law.

Parliamentary privilege does not protect criminal acts; investigation requires Speaker’s consent

The Supreme Court has held that parliamentary privileges do not extend to criminal acts. In a situation where the Lok Sabha Speaker reportedly cited intelligence inputs about a potential threat to the Prime Minister from Opposition MPs and cancelled the PM’s reply, what constitutional or legal scrutiny is possible? Given that courts traditionally refrain from interfering in legislative proceedings, can judicial review still apply if the issue involves alleged criminality or security lapses? Where does the balance lie between parliamentary privilege, the Speaker’s discretion and judicial oversight in such circumstances?

— Ramarajan, Moolakadai, Chennai

In the Jharkhand Assembly “cash-for-vote” case, the Supreme Court ruled that parliamentary privilege does not extend to criminal acts, even if connected to legislative functions. The Speaker, however, remains the authority over proceedings inside the House. If the Speaker records allegations of a conspiracy or threat within the House, investigative agencies can act if the information discloses a cognisable offence.

Police may register an FIR, but investigations linked to parliamentary proceedings generally require the Speaker’s approval. Courts usually avoid intervening in legislative matters, yet judicial scrutiny may arise if criminal conduct extends beyond protected legislative activity. Without the Speaker’s consent, such allegations often remain unresolved.

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DISCLAIMER: The views expressed here are of Justice K Chandru, who is providing guidance and direction based on his rich experience and knowledge of the law. This is not a substitute for legal recourse which must be taken as a follow-up if so recommended in these columns

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