Shared strength: To outbuild China, America needs friends

One of the most important weapons in the American arsenal is the Tomahawk cruise missile, which can travel over 1,000 miles to deliver 1,000 pounds of explosives within just feet of a target.

In June, the military fired 30 of them to destroy parts of Iran’s nuclear facilities without putting a single American soldier in danger. With threats growing in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, the US its allies can’t get enough of them. In a protracted war, we would run out of Tomahawks for our own forces, let alone for those of our allies.

Last year, a solution seemed to present itself. The US was close to a deal to co-produce Tomahawks at a factory in Japan, potentially doubling production of the missiles. The negotiations had been hard. The Americans had to convince Japan to agree to limits on how it could manufacture and use the weapons, and to whom it could sell them.

It wasn’t the Japanese who scuttled the partnership, however. It was opposition from within. Some State and Defense Department officials argued that expanding production abroad would damage the U.S. economy and put our technological edge at risk. An executive at RTX (formerly Raytheon), which makes the Tomahawk, sided with the opponents and argued for waiting until after the election in November, according to a former senior official involved in the negotiations. (RTX denies it tried to slow things down.) In the chaotic first months of the second Trump administration, the deal went cold.

The Tomahawk episode points to a central problem for US security: By itself the US cannot keep up with China’s soaring industrial capacity, which translates directly into military might. China has close to a 28% share of global manufacturing, while the United States has around 17%. By one count, it is acquiring advanced weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than America is. One Chinese shipyard can build more than all American builders combined.

The US now risks finding itself in the position of Britain in the late 19th century and Germany and Japan in the 20th: overtaken militarily by a rising industrial powerhouse. History shows such competitions between rising powers and established ones often end in catastrophic wars. China’s rising hostility to neighbors and accelerating military buildup show the urgent need for credible deterrence.

There is a ready solution to the problem. While the US can’t match China on its own, when joined by its closest allies, including Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia and the European Union, it can match China’s manufacturing capacity. For the sake of global security and freedom, the world’s democracies need to collaborate far more fully than they do now.

For too long, many allies have outsourced their own protection to the United States — “free riding,” as President Barack Obama put it. They have spent small shares of their economic output on the military, relying on the US instead. That is no longer tenable, given China’s increasing aggression in Asia and Russia’s warmongering in Europe.

The US is also at fault, as the failed Tomahawk case shows. We need to rethink our approach to alliances for a world where America is no longer the dominant superpower. We need to put more trust in steadfast allies and be open to collaborating with a wider range of partners. We must build alliances that are about more than just military cooperation but also about competing economically and technologically to match China’s industrial capacity.

Instead, in real time, Americans are watching as our president undermines the foundations of our alliances.

Following President Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, Denmark said it would buy missile defense systems from European makers rather than American ones. After Trump temporarily suspended military and intelligence aid to Ukraine early this year, some allies said they would reconsider using the F-35 for fear the United States could cut off support for the aircraft.

Trump is similarly damaging the relationships America needs in Asia. He has focused negotiations with Japan not on military production but on rice. Pressuring South Korea over trade, he has suggested he would withdraw US troops. He undermined efforts to forge an alliance with India against China by slapping the country with tariffs after Prime Minister Narendra Modi refused to credit Trump for defusing tensions with Pakistan.

China, meanwhile, is on an industrial tear. In 2024, Beijing produced 12 times more steel than the US, and it refines most of the critical minerals needed for weapons such as the F-35 fighter and Tomahawk missile. Even with allies and partners, the US will struggle to catch up without making other changes.

There are not many historical analogues to China’s growth. It has more than tripled its share of the world’s manufacturing since 2004, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. To keep up, the US needs its allies to step up.

In recent years, that has started to change. Japan has said it will spend 2% of GDP on defense. Europe, too, has shown a willingness to spend more. Russia’s war on Ukraine spurred NATO members to pledge to spend far more on defense in the coming years.

That progress builds on efforts to strengthen alliances. President Joe Biden brought Sweden and Finland into NATO, rebuilt military ties with the Philippines, and helped warm relations between distrustful allies in South Korea and Japan. In areas like electricity production and ships, strengthened alliances can make a difference in competition with China.

Now countries, even close allies, have other options. The US needs to reassure those that share our values that we remain committed to them. For those that don’t, like Saudi Arabia, we must work to show it is in their interest to align with us, not with China.

China is not invincible. Its challenges include an aging population, falling property values and entrenched corruption. Even if Beijing falters, however, it will remain formidable in the coming century. To compete with Beijing’s strength over the long run, the US is going to need all the friends it can get.

The New York Times