New challengers: Many things could imperil NATO
The alliance’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, just reaffirmed that he expects its members at the summit to adopt higher common spending levels, with each member state aiming to spend 3.5% of its gross domestic product on its military as part of 5% on overall security.
The leaders of NATO, the world’s most powerful military alliance, gather on Tuesday at The Hague in the Netherlands for their annual summit. Their meeting doesn’t seem headed for disaster, as many feared just a few months back.
Despite NATO’s success in winning the Cold War and remaining the most powerful community of nation-states in modern history, President Trump has openly questioned the alliance for years. He said that during his previous term, he told the leaders of NATO countries that he would “encourage” Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” against NATO members not pulling their weight in military spending. He repeatedly questioned whether the United States should honour the alliance’s mutual defence pledge under Article V of NATO’s founding treaty — the core idea that an attack on one is an attack on all — if members that did not live up to their financial obligations were attacked.
To be sure, the weakening US interest in NATO, the lack of American commitment to defend Ukraine and the uncertainty in a Europe unsure of how to plan with such a fickle partner could still put the alliance in peril. But there are several reasons those who are already declaring the alliance dead — and I know a lot of such people — should put aside their fatalism.
NATO’s 32 members are on the verge of achieving a stronger standard for acting together. The alliance’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, just reaffirmed that he expects its members at the summit to adopt higher common spending levels, with each member state aiming to spend 3.5% of its gross domestic product on its military as part of 5% on overall security. The current goal for military spending is only 2%. Most alliance members now meet that goal, but just barely, and it is not enough to put Europe in a position to confront Russia or meet other security challenges to Europe and North America.
When Trump and his team proposed the 5% level a few months ago, it seemed astronomically high — especially with the US itself spending only about 3.2% of its GDP on its military at present. (For reference, Cold War norms were 5% to 10%; the figure exceeded 35% in World War II.)
By broadening what could fall under national security spending to include upgrades to critical infrastructure, such as cybernetworks and roads, NATO members, including the US, seem to be working toward a new consensus. To be sure, a pledge does not necessarily translate into new spending or new capabilities, but it is a step in the right direction.
Another reason for optimism is provisional but is a big improvement from a few months ago: NATO is again mostly unified in wanting to prevent further Russian gains against Ukraine.
The US, to be sure, remains a wild card. Trump’s Oval Office showdown with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine in February remains among the most uncouth moments of Trump’s second term. But Zelensky went on to accept Trump’s terms for trying to promote a cease-fire in the Ukraine war, while President Putin of Russia did not. Trump has now publicly criticised Putin for his continued attacks on Ukrainian cities and publicly left open the door to the idea that it may soon be time to toughen sanctions on Russia.
Trump has, for the moment, at least, appeared to grasp that Putin is both the perpetrator and the problem in this conflict. Trump must do much more, including authorising a new American aid package and arms transfers to Ukraine and presenting concrete proposals for tightening the economic pressure. He should try to persuade European financial institutions holding frozen Russian assets to start seizing $10 billion a month and giving it to Ukraine until there is progress at the negotiating table.
Last, pessimists about NATO’s future should be reminded that the US has not reduced any of its military forces in Europe since Trump was inaugurated. It may do so in the coming months. But as long as American armed forces remain in parts of NATO territory close to Russia, the chances that Vladimir Putin will attack any NATO member are low. If the Russian president knows that US forces would be near any attack on, say, a Baltic member of NATO, he is unlikely to carry one out, despite Trump’s shaky public commitment to the alliance.
History provides a useful guide here. The original 12 members who signed the treaty establishing NATO in Washington in 1949 were unified in their fear of Soviet aggression and ambition. There was no Trump-like figure in their midst, signalling uncertain commitment to the alliance. Yet the treaty and its muddled Article V provision (try reading it if you think it was an ironclad promise that the US would come to Europe’s defence in a war) were seen as insufficient to deter Moscow. Only when NATO brought West Germany into the alliance, allowed German rearmament and stationed alliance forces (including Americans) on the border between West Germany and East Germany did NATO member populations begin to feel secure.
@THE NEW YORK TIMES
