Editorial: SCO summit and policy dilemmas

CHENNAI: The recently concluded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in China has brought to the fore the contradictions and dilemmas of India's foreign policy. They relate to the growing affinity between China and Pakistan, which could upset the delicate balance of power in South Asia and India’s balancing act with regard to the conflict between Israel and Iran.

Whatever the political rhetoric of new regimes, continuity in foreign policy is almost unchangeable, while there will be room for making some changes or shifts. India, under successive NDA governments, has been making some departures and changes to its foreign policy.

For instance, the strategic ties with Israel mark an ideological shift, while continuing relationships with oil-rich Russia, Iran and the Middle East arise out of economic pragmatism.

New Delhi will face similar challenges as it has one foot in the Western camp and another in assorted non-Western groups of the Global South.

India was disappointed with the joint statement proposed at the China-led SCO as it tended to lean heavily towards Pakistan’s skewed narrative on terrorism and did not adequately represent New Delhi’s concerns and stance on regional security.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who represented India at the SCO summit of defence ministers in Qingdao, refused to sign the joint statement because it mentioned militant activities in Baluchistan but not the Pahalgam killings.

Singh wanted SCO to criticise countries that indulge in cross-border terrorism and provide shelter to terrorists. He didn’t need to name Pakistan here. A major cause of concern for India should be how Pakistan scored over India in the global narrative game and how India is lagging in swaying friendly nations to its side on issues central to its policy on regional security.

This lends credence to the criticism that the recent delegations of parliamentarians to foreign countries in the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack were more due to domestic politics and less driven by foreign policy considerations.

Secondly, India had to issue a clarification distancing itself from another recent SCO statement condemning Israel’s attacks on Iran. The MEA statement said: “The overall position of India as stated above was communicated to other SCO members.

Keeping that in mind, India did not participate in the discussions on the above-mentioned SCO statement.” India’s statement calls for the utilisation of channels of dialogue and diplomacy “to work towards de-escalation”. India makes no bones about its friendly relations with both Iran and Israel, and therefore would not want to be seen leaning towards one at the cost of the other in their rivalry.

India has done a similar balancing act between Russia and NATO in the Ukraine conflict. The nationalistic government is able to pursue strategic autonomy, another variant of non-alignment, which prioritises India’s economic and security interests. Thus, it can simultaneously maintain friendly relations with two countries opposed to each other or even in conflict.

So much so that it has been striving for a working relationship with China despite border conflicts. Rajnath Singh impressed upon his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun, the need to maintain peace and tranquillity along the Indo-China border.

The crux of the discussions was to explore ways “to bring back a semblance of normalcy in the bilateral relations,” which were adversely affected by the 2020 border standoff.

Overall, Indian foreign policy is undergoing transition, and its broad contours are evolving. In a fast-changing global scenario, it must pass the trials by fire.